Halakhah Think Tank

בורא מיני בשמים with no sense of smell?

2012-01-30T11:37:00.002-05:00

Can a person who lost their sense of smell still say בורא מיני בשמים at Havdalah? Can they say this berakhah for others as part of the ritual?

Berakhot over smells are like other birkot hanehenin, said in order to thank God before benefitting from the pleasures of this world. On Berakhot 43b, Rav evocatively grounds the obligation to bless before smelling a pleasant smell in the verse כל הנשמה תהלל י-ה, which suggests that even things enjoyed via breath must result in praise for God.

The point of these berakhot is to avoid benefitting from the world without displaying the requisite gratitude to God. Therefore, normally, a berakhah relating to bodily enjoyment may only be made when one is enjoying the food oneself. Therefore, who is not planning on eating food, or who cannot smell, would quite obviously not make the appropriate berakhot for those actions. This is the subject of a short section of the Gemara on Rosh Hashanah 29a-b. A baraita taught by Ahava bdR. Zeira states that 1) One can generally say berakhot for others, even when one no longer has an obligation to say them oneself (such as blowing Shofar for someone else after one has already done so that day, and 2) one cannot say berakhot over wine and bread—which seem to refer to all birkot hanehenin—on behalf of someone else, if one has no personal obligation to say the berakhah at that moment (i.e. one is not eating). A later baraita states this explicitly: One may not sayhamotzi for guests if one is not eating bread with them. One may only do so for the members of one’s family, in order to teach them how to say berakhot. In other words, unless there is an educational agenda at stake, one only makes berakhot over food (and by extension, smell) when one is actually involved in the enjoyment of eating (or smelling).

The situation is somewhat more complicated when these berakhot get wrapped up in mandatory rituals as opposed to simply personal enjoyment. For instance, the berakhah of בורא פרי הגפן is said as part of Kiddush. On the one hand, this blessing is said because one is going to drink from the wine, and thus perhaps cannot be said by someone who has no intention of drinking the wine. On the other hand, it is folded in to an obligatory ritual and, therefore, perhaps one could say it vicariously on someone else’s behalf just as one can do more generally with mitzvot one has already fulfilled. Back in Rosh Hashanah, Rava asks this very question with regard to the hamotzi over matzah at the Seder, and the wine drunk at Kiddush on Friday night. The Gemara resolves the question by citing a story of R. Ashi, who reports that when he was at R. Pappi’s house, R. Pappi would make Kiddush for himself and those assembled and then would make a second Kiddush for workers coming in late from the fields. While the story itself might only be permitting the idea of saying Kiddush twice for different audiences, the sugya assumes R. Pappi was not obligated to say בורא פרי הגפן the second time—and perhaps did not even drink the wine—and yet he said this berakhah. This establishes the principle that a person may say birkot hanehenin when they are folded into a larger, obligatory ritual framework, even if the person will not actually enjoy the food or drink at that moment.

What counts as an obligatory framework? Well, Kiddush and matzah quite obviously count. But what abouthamotzi on Friday night? A Tosafistic view (cited in the collection of Tosafot in Mordechai Pesahim ch. 10) takes for granted that this hamotzi is not obligatory in the same way as Kiddush. And this is the holding of the Shulhan Arukh. [Indeed, this berakhah is not connected into any other berakhot of mitzvah, the way both Kiddush and matzah are.]

Where does besamim in havdalah fit into this equation? On the one hand, besamim is already mentioned inMishnah Berakhot 8:5 and Tosefta Berakhot 5:30 as a core part of the havdalah ritual, the only argument relating to its placement. On the other hand, Rav states on Berakhot 53b that one need not make a great effort to find a candle for havdalah and Ra’avad (cited in Rashba there) states that this is all the more so forbesamim, which is merely for personal pleasure. In other words, while besamim may be an ancient part of the havdalah ritual, it is not truly legally significant. It is an aesthetically pleasing addition.

In keeping with this latter line of thinking, R. Efraim (Regensburg, 12^th c., cited in Or Zarua II:92 and Mordechai Berakhot #188) ruled that a person who has no sense of smell may not make a berakhah overbesamim even in the conext of havdalah, even if the goal is to fulfill the obligations of others, even members of one’s own household. [He is specifically asked this question by R. Yehudah b. Kalonymos, who had no sense of smell.] Tur (R. Ya’akov b. Asher, Germany/Spain, 13^th-14^th c.) accepts the notion that a person with no sense of smell should not make this berakhah for himself, but objects to the ban on such a person making a blessing for the members of one’s household. Tur cites the baraita we recorded above: a person can makehamotzi for the members of one’s household without eating bread; why should this be any different? He reports that his father ruled that one may indeed say the berakhah over besamim for בני ביתו even if one does not smell the spices themselves. Orhot Hayyim (R. Aharon Hakohen of Lunel, 13^th-14^th c.) takes an entirely different approach. He argues that even one who cannot smell spices can/should nonetheless say the berakhah, since the spices still have an effect on one’s head and body, even if the particular aroma cannot be detected. [An even more unusual justification of this sort can be found in R. Yitzhak Tirna’s Sefer Haminhagim: since a person without a sense of smell could be saved from a fire by others smelling smoke, he nonetheless benefits from the sense of smell being present in the world and can thus say the berakhah!] Obviously, such a person would be able to say the blessing for others as well.

Beit Yosef rejects the Tur’s challenge to R. Efraim, saying: the baraita in the Gemara only refers to small children who are still learning how to make berakhot. But the baraita provides no support for the more general permission to fulfill the obligations of others that R. Efraim was arguing against. Nonetheless, he thinks that Tur’s ruling in the name of his father is still justified: despite the blessing over besamim being an aesthetic custom, it is an old one given sanction by Hazal and thus it takes on enough of an obligatory status to allow a person who is not fulfilling an obligation in that moment to perform it on behalf of others.

Shulhan Arukh therefore follows the Tur, allowing a person with no sense of smell to make the berakhah overbesamim on behalf of small children still learning berakhot as well as on behalf others who do not know how to make the blessing themselves. [The question of whether a person not currently obligated can fulfill the obligations of those who know how to do so for themselves is a separate discussion.]

However, many subsequent authorities reject the second point above, restricting one with no sense of smell to making a berakhah over besamim to cases of children learning how to say berakhot. Essentially, they return to the view of R. Efraim. Magen Avraham 297:5 points out that Shulhan Arukh elsewhere follows the Tosafistic view that the hamotzi on Friday night may not be said for others unless one is eating; why would we be more lenient with besamim, which he assumes is even less obligatory? Magen Avraham further argues that it is not even clear that Tur was arguing or anything more than allowing a person with no sense of smell to bless on behalf of his young children. Taz OH 297:8 is explicit that one should follow R. Efraim’s view. Radbaz asserts—like R. Efraim—that besamim is really not a mitzvah at all and rejects Beit Yosef’s attempt to counter this logic. He further states—rejecting the approach of the Sefer Haminhagim above—the one without a sense of smell in no way benefits from smell at all and therefore can in no way say this berakhah for themselves or others who are obligated. R. Akiva Eiger argues that even if it is a mitzvah, a person who truly cannot smell is completely exempt from that mitzvah and there is no way they can fulfill the obligations of others.

Responsa Shevut Ya’akov III:20 (R. Ya’akov Reischer, Poland/Germany, 17^th-18^th c.) revives Orhot Hayyim. While accepting the critiques of Magen Avraham and Taz, he argues that in fact someone with no sense of smell may appropriately bless over besamim; all we care is that the person can breathe and inhale the fragrance, even if they cannot detect it through smell. He thinks it is responsible to rely on the Beit Yosef in the limited case of making the blessing for others, even if we would not allow it in a case of a person saying it for themselves. Yosif Ometz #17 (R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai) rejects this reasoning forcefully along with Shulhan Arukh’s ruling. But he does permit someone who only occasionally loses her sense of smell to say the berakhah for others even when in a period when she cannot smell, given that the positions of Tur and Orhot Hayyim are sufficient to rely on in this sort of doubtful situation.

The practical conclusion would seem to be that a person who has never had a sense of smell should not say the berakhah of besamim ever. If such a person is making havdalah, someone else should make the berakhah over besamim when getting to that point. Someone who occasionally loses their sense of smell—and perhaps even one who has lost it but who has reason to think s/he will get it back—can rely on Yosif Ometz to make the berakhah of besamim for others who don’t know how, but should otherwise refrain from doing so. In a circumstance that would cause great embarrassment or shame, Orhot Hayyim, Sefer Haminhagim and Shevut Ya’akov are great enough authorities to rely on to allow such a person to make havdalah.

Eating and Drinking Before Davening in the Morning

2011-09-08T14:28:00.000-04:00

Rabbi Ethan Tucker

Our contemporary lives always seem rushed, as we each try to cram in as many activities as possible to the limited amount of time we feel we have available. Mornings can be particularly challenging, as observant Jews attempt to get themselves ready, out of the house, find time for both prayer and breakfast and off to work on time. Add to this the factor of a commute to somewhere somewhat far from home, and many challenges arise. Among them is how to manage balancing making prayer and the cultivation of one's relationship with God the first experience of the day, contributing to the communal by attending minyan and maintaining healthy eating habits around breakfast. This post aims to engage some of the literature around this topic. [Eating before davening on Shabbat has its own pedigree and raised other issues, such as the proper placement of kiddush. The below material is focused on weekday davening.]

The ban on eating before davening finds its first mention on Berkahot 10b:

ואמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא משום רבי אליעזר בן יעקב: מאי דכתיב: +ויקרא י"ט+ לא תאכלו על הדם, - לא תאכלו קודם שתתפללו על דמכם. (איכא דאמרי,) אמר רבי יצחק אמר רבי יוחנן אמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא משום רבי אליעזר בן יעקב: כל האוכל ושותה ואחר כך מתפלל - עליו הכתוב אומר: +מלכים א' י"ד+ ואתי השלכת אחרי גוך, אל תקרי גויך אלא גאיך. אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא: לאחר שנתגאה זה - קבל עליו מלכות שמים.

In a series of sayings by R. Yose bR. Hanina in the name of R. Eliezer b. Yaakov, we get these two statements: A) One should pray for one's "blood"--for one's basic needs and right to exist--before one eats, with a poetic linking of this requirement to the verse לא תאכלו על הדם. B) Eating and drinking before davening is considered an act of unacceptable hubris, with God classifying those who take care of their own needs before accepting the yoke of heaven as abandoning God in a nonchalant way, "tossing God aside."

The key questions that emerge from this text are:

1) What counts as eating and drinking? Are there minimal or insignificant types of eating and drinking that don't trigger this opprobrium?
2) How unforgiving is this expectation? Are there ever times when one can eat and drink before davening? What if a person will be so hungry that they will be unable to focus properly on davening?
3) What parts of the davening must be said in order to avoid this problem?
4) What role might tefillah betzibbur play in this equation?

1) The statements in Berakhot do not engage shades of gray on this topic. Later poskim engage the language of לאחר שנתגאה זה to argue that certain forms of eating and drinking evince no hubris and are thus not a problem. Raaviah I:30 (R. Eliezer b. Yoel Halevi, Germany, 12th-13th c.) therefore states that only intoxicating drinks are a problem (מידי דמשכר), as they give a feeling of pride and contentedness. Water would certainly be permitted. Orhot Hayyim Tefillah #15 (R. Aharon Hakohen, Provence/Majorca, 13th-14th c.) cites a view (Rabbeinu Peretz?) rejecting this and forbidding even the drinking of water. R. Yitzhak Aboab (Spain, 15th c.) considers both views and follows Ra'aviah, and so Beit Yosef. Ra'aviah's permission is potentially expansive, though Rosh and others only report the permission for water, perhaps indicating a compromise position between the two views. A narrower reading of Ra'aviah leads to later debates regarding coffee and tea (which generally end up permitted), and coffee and tea with sugar, which are frowned upon by some poskim as displaying hubris. [On this point, see Mishnah Berurah vs. Arukh Hashulhan, the latter being much more expansive in his reading of Ra'aviah.] Though there is some disagreement over details, the basic idea is clear: the statement in the gemara is aiming to forbid eating and drinking that gives one a sense of being pampered and having one's needs and desires sated before approaching God. How can one approach God and prayer without some sense of vulnerability? And how can one feel vulnerable after sitting down to a full English breakfast (and maybe even less)?

2) Rambam Tefillah 5:2 rules that one who is hungry or thirsty (clearly above and beyond what one would expect on average) such that it will be difficult to focus while davening is considered "ill" for this purpose and should eat and drink first. This is codified in SA OH 89:4. The value here is clear: waiting to eat and drink is intended to enhance the tefillah experience by generating more vulnerability and less haughtiness. If this practice ends up detracting from one's ability to pray and connect to God, then it undermines its own purpose. [It is also common Chabad practice to eat before davening in order to daven with as clear a mind as possible.]
In considering Ra'aviah's view described above, R. Yitzhak Aboab goes further than simply ruling like him. He argues that once we accept the notion that the problem here is not eating and drinking per se, but rather גאוה/pride, then any eating and drinking which is not done in an inappropriately proud fashion is permissible. He therefore rules that any eating for the sake of רפואה is permitted before davening. This is codified in SA OH 89:3. Magen Avraham 89:12 clarifies that this means to permit even types of food that might be subject to the concern of גאוה and even for someone who is not ravenous, as in the Rambam's case. Arukh Hashulhan OH 89:24 spells this out further: this permission includes even eating that is not in response to serious hunger, but which is simply about maintaining a healthy lifestyle, as in the case of vitamins or eating to maintain basic nutrition and balance. Someone for whom eating after davening would compromise this goal is permitted to eat beforehand. This line of reasoning emphasizes Ra'aviah's emphasis on mindset and framing for early morning eating and drinking.

3) The plain sense of להתפלל in both of these statements is that one must pray the Amidah. One might argue for a more flexible reading of this statement as featuring some basic form of prayer--the idea being that before one eats and drinks, one does *something* of significance to reconnect with God. Indeed, the second statement in Berakhot uses the phrase לאחר שנתגאה זה - קבל עליו מלכות שמים to describe the problem with the person who improperly eats and drinks before praying. This seems to focus not on the Amidah per se, but rather on some basic acceptance of the God's sovereignty and authority, a phrase usually associated with Shema and not the Amidah. Perhaps, therefore, the concern here is not rigidly anchored around the Amidah. And in fact, in the context of another restriction--that pertaining to refraining from work before davening in the morning--there was a common practice in 15th century Austria for people to come to shul, say the early part of davening up until Barukh Sheamar, and then go off to deal with other matters until they would presumably finish the davening later. Terumat Hadeshen #18 (R. Yisrael Isserlein) reports this practice, but says that the plain sense of the Talmud is to forbid doing any work until after one has said the Amidah. Nonetheless, Rema on SA OH 89:3 casts Terumat Hadeshen's conclusion as a preference for stringency on this matter and thereby seems to grant some legitimacy to reciting the early parts of the davening as sufficient. [Levush casts it differently and Arukh Hashulhan OH 89:21 cracks down on any lenient reading of the Rema.] If one extrapolated form this discussion about work to the discussion about eating and drinking, one might grant some legitimacy to eating and drinking before davening as long as the first parts of davening (birkhot hashahar, the abbreviated Shema, etc.) were said first. In any event, poskim generally say that even when one has a legitimate reason for eating or drinking before davening (health, weeakness, etc.), one should recite at least the Shema and some of the early berakhot first. [See MB 89:22 in the middle for one example.]

4) The rubber really meets the road when there is a direct confrontation between tefillah betzibbur and one's ability to wait until after davening to eat. The relative values of praying with a minyan and praying before eating then come into stark relief.

On Berakhot 28b, we find the following story:

רב אויא חלש ולא אתא לפרקא דרב יוסף. למחר כי אתא, בעא אביי לאנוחי דעתיה דרב יוסף. אמר ליה: מאי טעמא לא אתא מר לפרקא? אמר ליה: דהוה חליש לבאי ולא מצינא. אמר ליה: אמאי לא טעמת מידי ואתית? אמר ליה: לא סבר לה מר להא דרב הונא? דאמר רב הונא: אסור לו לאדם שיטעום כלום קודם שיתפלל תפלת המוספין! - אמר ליה: איבעי ליה למר לצלויי צלותא דמוספין ביחיד, ולטעום מידי ולמיתי!

R. Avya was too weak to make it to one of R. Yosef's public lectures. Abaye suggests to him that he should have eaten something in order to have the strength to go. R. Avya says this was impossible, because of R. Huna's ruling that one is not allowed to eat anything prior to Musaf [which seems to have followed R. Yosef's lecture]. Abaye suggests that he should have prayed in private, eaten and then come to the lecture.

R. Moshe Hagiz (18th c., Jerusalem) in Leket Hakemah, Hanhagat Haboker considers the case of an elderly or weak person who cannot wait to eat until the end of communal davening, especially on Shabbat and Yom Tov. He rules that it is preferable for the person to pray Shaharit at home בנחת and then to make kiddush, eat something and then head to shul to answer kaddish, kedushah etc. and to pray Musaf with the community. This is better, in his view, than having a cup of tea or coffee to tide one over before shul, even if it means missing Shaharit with the community. In other words, the value of praying before eating and drinking is very strong, and even the possibility of merely private prayer recommends itself over and above any disregard for this proper order.

However, the gemara in Berakhot concludes that R. Huna's tradition regarding the ban on eating before Musaf is not normative, raising the possibility that all of R. Avya's behavior is called into question. Perhaps Abaye only advised him to pray privately rather than eat because he thought there was a hard and fast ban on eating before Musaf. But a more flexible approach to eating before Musaf might have led to a recommendation to eat rather than miss tefillah betzibbur. And perhaps, given that the ban on eating before Shaharit is already riddled with exceptions for those who are too weak to wait until afterwards, tefillah betzibbur might rank higher than refraining from all eating before davening.

I haven't found a noted posek who says this explicitly, though it may be implicit in a number of poskim who highly value tefillah betzibbur, like R. Moshe Feinstein, who considers it a bona fide obligation to pray with a minyan three times a day. You can also see this analysis, which trends in this general direction.

Conclusion

The ideal is clearly to pack up something from home that fulfills one's breakfast needs, bring it to minyan and eat it after tefillah betzibbur. If this is impossible and will lead to a situation of feeling weak or unhealthy, then one could argue that it is better to daven individually and then eat, thereby maintaining the value of attending to one's personal relationship with God through prayer before attending to one's own needs. However, if that practice is threatening one's long-term commitment to tefillah--particularly when one does not have in their upbringing a stable reference point of a regular commitment to daily tefillah--and tefillah betzibbur will serve an important strengthening function in this regard, it seems reasonable to claim that little will be gained by praying individually at home in an unsustainable way that may lead to no davening at all. Moreover, the framing of this issue by Ra'aviah and R. Yitzhak Aboab--accepted by the major poskim--makes it all the more reasonable to allow some eating at home in the name of nutrition and health when it is impossible to eat something healthy after minyan. It is possible that even poskim who might have resisted this in their own day might have thought differently about this in the context of commutes and other realities of professional, urban life.

A reasonable middle ground would be to be pick a few days a week where one goes straight to minyan and a few where one eats at home first (perhaps Torah reading days); perhaps that is a sustainable balance. In any event, any eating done before davening should avoid concerns of גאוה/hubris by being simple and non-elaborate, just giving enough sustenance to feel healthy as one goes through one's morning. And one should say birkhot hashahar and the early appearance of Shema in the siddur such that a basic acceptance of God's role in one's life has already been established before eating.

May Elul be a time of consistent and deep experiences with tefillah that strengthen both us as individuals and the communities in which we daven.

The Nine Days

2011-07-28T16:31:00.001-04:00

by Rabbi Ethan Tucker

Mishnah Ta’anit 4:6 articulates the principle that, with the arrival of Av, we minimize our joy. Various texts, synthesized in Shulhan Arukh 551, give this concrete expression: we minimize our profit-making initiatives and avoid building or renovation projects that are about increasing joy and pleasure (e.g. building a swimming pool or renovating a display space for art). This frames the mood that other traditions connected with the 9 days, which attempt to foreshadow the coming sadness of 9 Av through various ascetic deprivations.

As is the case with regard to all practices connected with 9 Av, there is a plausible read of Jewish history that sees all of these practices and 17 Tammuz as obviated in light of the return of the Jewish people to the status of sovereign majority in the Land of Israel. Some have even argued that this dramatic turn of events vitiates 9 Av itself or at least renders it an optional fast. That central question is beyond the scope of this summary, which aims to describe practices leading up to 9 Av for those who feel that the successes of Zionism do not fully eradicate the ongoing significance of this period of mourning. See the end of this summary for a final thought on this matter.

Several practices in various communities are specific to the first 9 days of Av:

Weddings, Celebrations and Musical Instruments

Laundry

A baraita on Ta’anit 29b reports a number of traditions on laundering clothing, with R. Meir forbidding laundering from 1-9 Av, R. Yehudah forbidding laundering during the entire month of Av, and R. Shimon b. Gamliel forbidding laundering during the week in which 9 Av falls. Mishnah Ta’anit 4:7 sides with the view of R. Shimon b. Gamliel, allowing for doing laundry on Thursday (or Friday) in honor of Shabbat.

On Ta’anit 29b, there is a discussion regarding the precise nature of the ban on laundry. R. Nahman thinks it is about not wearing laundered clothes. In other words, this ban is similar to the ban on haircutting, in that it is about appearance. R. Sheshet thinks the ban is more expansive and includes a ban on doing laundry even if one only intends to wear the clothing after 9 Av. It is thus about both appearance and refraining from constructive, restorative acts like that of laundering clothing. The gemara ends up concluding that we follow R. Sheshet.

While the gemara seems content to apply this restriction during the week of 9 Av itself, many European communities reverted to R. Meir’s position and forbade wearing laundered clothing or doing laundry during the first 9 days of Av (see Maharil). Many communities did not apply this restriction to laundering children’s clothing, and Rema indeed rules that one can launder any kind of clothing that is regularly soiled to the point where it can no longer be worn (as is often the case with children’s clothing and adult undergarments).

Other interesting discussions emerged regarding what counts as “laundry”. Already in the Talmud, a Babylonian text suggests that the laundering of clothing in Babylonia is not as effective as that of the Land of Israel (likely because the rivers and streams in Babylonia were much fuller of silt and slower flowing). Therefore, the text claims, only ironed clothing falls under the prohibition. Subsequent interpreters and authorities argue over their own local conditions.

A bottom line sensible rule for observing the ban on laundry during the 9 days in the contemporary world seems to be: Don’t do laundry in a washing machine if at all possible and certainly don’t iron or dry clean clothing during this period. And don’t wear clothing that gives off an obvious impression of just having been laundered or dry cleaned (as opposed to T-shirts and other more basic items of clothing that don’t look so different when freshly cleaned). This includes brand new clothing that has never been washed, ironed or dry cleaned, but which still contributes to an appearance inappropriate for this time period. In general, there is no leniency to wash clothing in honor of Shabbat once one reverts to R. Meir’s position on laundry, though a number of later authorities permit laundry for Shabbat if one has nothing else to wear.

Meat and Wine

It is clear from the Talmud that there was only a ban at eating meat and drinking wine during the last meal prior to 9 Av (unless the day before 9 Av was on Shabbat). Nonetheless, more stringent practices emerge. Rambam is already aware of those who stop eating meat at the beginning of Av (with the exception of Shabbat) and Ra’aviah reports both this practice as well as a practice not to drink wine during this period. These restrictions get cited in the Shulhan Arukh and are endorsed as normal practice in the Rema, with exceptions made for celebratory feast, such as a circumcision or the completion of a major section of Jewish learning. Rema makes clear that this practice even extends to Havdalah, and thus if wine is used for havdalah, it should, if possible, be drunk by a minor who is present. Alternatively, one could use another acceptable liquid for Havadalah, such as beer or juice.

With regard to beer, note that the main thrust of the practice surrounding meat and wine is their connection with the sacrificial order (see Tosefta Sotah 15:11) rather than the pleasure they give or the alcoholic content of wine. Beer and other alcoholic beverages are thus acceptable during this period, since these were never offered on the altar in the Temple.

Bathing

The Talmud contains no restrictions on bathing during this period, including on the day before 9 Av. Nonetheless, Rambam is already aware of a practice of refraining from going to a bathhouse during the week in which 9 Av falls. This seems to be limited to bathing in heated water. Ra’aviah reports a practice not to bathe for the first 9 days of Av and Terumat Hadeshen argues that this applies even to cold water, like swimming in a river. [There are several disagreements as to whether one can be lenient on Friday afternoon as part of the preparation for Shabbat.] In any event, even for those observing this practice, it is always permitted to bathe in order to remove dirt; the focus here is on bathing for pure pleasure. Again, a common sense guideline: regular showering as part of a basic hygiene regime is permitted, but showers that are overly long or hotter than they need to be to avoid basic discomfort would be out of line with what this restriction is trying to accomplish, which is the achievement of a more ascetic pose leading up to 9 Av.

Conclusion

As a closing point, it is clear from every section above that these practices manifested themselves in a range of ways in different communities. For those who grew up with no particular practice and for those who feel that the contemporary State of Israel ought to impact this area of practice in a significant way, it is appropriate to think about observing some of these practices in their more moderate forms. For instance, one might only refrain from bathing in hot water during the week in which 9 Av falls and might act similarly with respect to laundry and shaving/haircutting. These are just a few of the ways in which one might achieve a balancing of values in this area of Jewish practice, allowing for the maintenance of some ancient customs while still recognizing the dramatically different moment in Jewish history that we live in compared to many of our ancestors. Another challenge is to strike a balance between one’s individual synthesis and some basic communal norm, though a number of the activities above are more private and thus more amenable to varied practice even within a single community.

Shiv'a Asar B'Tammuz (the 17th of Tammuz) and "the Three Weeks"

2011-07-28T16:26:00.000-04:00

by Rabbi Ethan Tucker

Already in the wake of the destruction of the First Temple, there was a fast in the fourth month, the month we now call Tammuz. This may have been connected to the breaching of the walls of Jerusalem by the Babylonians on the 9^th day of the fourth month, an event and date preserved in Jeremiah 39:2 and 52:6-7. But no day of the month is prescribed for this fast when it is mentioned in Zechariah 8:19.

By the time we get to rabbinic literature, the “fast of the fourth month” mentioned in Zechariah is understood to refer to the 17^th of Tammuz. This is the date when the Talmud says that the walls of Jerusalem were breached by the Romans following their siege of Jerusalem in the year 70 CE. This date is also mentioned by Josephus, Wars of the Jews VI:93. Rabbinic tradition in Mishnah Ta’anit 4:6 ascribed other calamities to this day: The breaking of the first tablets given to Moshe (in the context of the sin of the Golden Calf), the cessation of the daily offering in the Temple (likely on the same day that the Romans broke through the walls—see Josephus); a public burning of a Torah scroll and the setting up of an idolatrous statue in the Temple precincts. The years and contexts of the last two events are uncertain.

Zechariah chapters 7 and 8 are largely devoted the question of whether the “fast of the fifth month”—known to us as Tish’a B’Av—remains relevant once the Second Temple has been rebuilt. After a group asks whether the fast should still be observed, lengthy prophecies are reported to Zechariah with two main points: 1) God was never that interested in the fast day in the first place and is equally uninterested in the question of its abrogation. God is mainly interested in the construction of a just society where the weak are protected and corruption is rooted out. 2) The four fast days (known to us as Tzom Gedaliah, Asara B’Tevet, Shiv’a Asar B’Tammuz and Tish’a B’Av) will be a time of rejoicing. Whether this is to take place in the present or in the future is left unclear.

Picking up on this answer, the Talmud Bavli on Rosh Hashanah 18a-b has a short sugya that tries to lay out a framework for these fast days and their potential status as days of rejoicing. The bottom line the emerges is this: 1) In a time of shalom, these days are ones of rejoicing (on which it would seem to be forbidden to fast). 2) In a time of shemad (persecution/suffering), these days are mandatory fast days. 3) In a time covered by neither of the above categories, three of these fasts are optional (though unclear if individuals or communities decide). Tish’a B’Av remains mandatory.

While early post-Talmudic sources affirm the optional nature of three of these fast days—including 17 Tammuz—later medieval sources begin to say that the Jewish community has accepted them upon themselves and they are thus mandatory, especially given that there are still Jewish communities under persecution. And so was the official status of these days in almost all Jewish communities until the 20^th century.

The success of political Zionism as manifested in the founding of the State of Israel has raised serious questions with regard to the status of these fasts. Some have argued that the restoration of full Jewish political sovereignty over the land of Israel has returned us to category 1) and thus all of these fast days—including Tish’a B’Av have been canceled and are now days of celebration. Others have maintained that while we might not describe ourselves as living in a time of shalom (for all the obvious reasons that political Zionism has not completely solved issues of Jewish sovereignty and independence and because of a great deal of ongoing persecution and war in the context of both the Jewish community and the global community beyond it), we certainly don’t live in a time of shemad, and the founding of the State of Israel is certainly significant enough to upend the medieval consensus for mandatory observance and return us to the purer optional status of category 3). Among those who take an optional stance, there are many who have advocated fasting half a day and breaking the fast after Minhah. Still others have argued that until some dramatic sign of shalom—on the messianic/apocalyptic order of magnitude of the rebuilding of a Third Temple or its equivalent—we remain with the medieval consensus that these days are fully mandatory.

I would add that the American Jewish experience of living in a free democratic society that is deeply different from many exilic communities Jews have found themselves in throughout the ages has also contributed to the sense that these fast days do not have the same power they have had at other points in time.

This is a complex topic. You can listen to a shiur on this topic here and the key sources are here.

My own feeling is that the factors of the founding of the State of Israel and living as equals in American democracy are too significant to claim that we either live in a time of shemad or even in the world of medieval consensus that the Jewish people has clearly accepted these fasts upon themselves as unquestionably mandatory. It is hard to imagine that all of those medieval authorities would have lived through 1948 and 1967 unaffected. On the other hand, I am skittish about suggesting that with the creation of the State of Israel, shalom has arrived, and worry about running afoul of Zechariah’s call to prioritize the creation of a just and perfect society over the question of the celebratory abrogation of fast days.

It therefore seems to me that we are best described as living in category 3), where the fast days other than Tish’a B’Av are optional, and I personally do not feel that there is any formal obligation to fast on the other three fast days. So why do I fast and why does Yeshivat Hadar choose to observe these days as fast days in terms of our liturgy and our practice? There are, to my mind, two compelling reasons: First, there is much injustice and imperfection in the world in general, and in the sovereign Jewish state in particular. These days and their fasting ritual are a powerful way to trigger us to think about those issues. Second, Zechariah tells us that these days will one day be ones of rejoicing. That means that they must be maintained on the calendar so that the Jewish people will remember them when history takes the turn that will enable us to see the world as one infused with shalom. I have personally committed to be among those that guard that calendrical space for the future and I think it is most appropriate for yoshvei beit hamidrash—those who spend the lion’s share of their time learning from the Jewish past and its application to the Jewish future to be among those who assume that road.

Bein Hametzarim (“The Three Weeks”

The three weeks from 17 Tammuz through 9 Av are commonly known as בין המצרים—bein hametzarim—“the narrows,” the time of year in which Jewish grief over Jewish history is most acutely focused. It was during the month of Tammuz that the walls of Jerusalem were breached by the invading Babylonian army and later the Roman army, attack that culminated in the destruction of the First and Second Temples on 9 Av. 9 Av became a kind of calendrical receptacle for other tragedies in Jewish history that transpired throughout the ages.

Aside from the observance of 17 Tammuz and 9 Av as fast days, a range of practices sprung up over the generations with regard to the days and weeks leading up to 9 Av. The ancient liturgical cycle in Eretz Yisrael already reflected the special nature of these three weeks, in that the haftarot chosen for the three weeks prior to 9 Av reflected the sense of impending doom many Jews felt during this period.

Two of the main practices that emerged: 1) Refraining from getting haircuts or shaving; 2) Refraining from weddings, celebrations and any use of musical instruments.

Haircutting

A baraita on Ta’anit 29b reports several views, with R. Meir forbidding haircutting from 1-9 Av, R. Yehudah forbidding haircutting during the entire month of Av, and R. Shimon b. Gamliel forbidding cutting hair during the week in which 9 Av falls. Mishnah Ta’anit 4:7 sides with the view of R. Shimon b. Gamliel.

In a kind of shifted version of R. Yehudah’s position, Sefer Haminhagim, an Ashkenazic compendium of European practices, reports a custom to refrain from haircutting during the 3 weeks between 17 Tammuz and 9 Av. Many maintain this practice until this day.

Weddings, Celebrations and Musical Instruments

There is a baraita on Yevamot 43a that gets understood to mean that during some unspecified period of time before the week in which 9 Av falls, people refrain from getting married or having parties celebrating betrothal (betrothal itself being permitted). Ramban applies this restriction to the first 9 days of Av. So rules Shulhan Arukh. Sefer Haminhagim reports that medieval Ashkenazic practice was to back up the restriction on weddings to 17 Tammuz. So rules Rema. Aharonim assert that this added Ashkenazic restriction did not extend to betrothal parties but only to weddings specifically. [See Mishnah Berurah 551:19.]

Magen Avraham 551:10 rules that it seems to him that any kind of dancing is forbidden starting at 17 Tammuz, even if it is not attached to a betrothal party.

Responsa Kappei Aharon #52 analyzes the question of whether the playing of musical instruments is forbidden during the 3 weeks and concludes that it is totally obvious that such playing is forbidden--despite this not being mentioned specifically in the Shulhan Arukh or its commentaries—given that the Shulhan Arukh assumes that it is problematic--in the wake of the destruction of the Temple—ever to play musical instruments, with only some authorities permitting in mitzvah-related situations. Even though observance of this prohibition on using musical instruments at all has largely fallen by the wayside in most Jewish communities, poskim have tried to enforce the prohibition during specifically intense periods of mourning like the 3 weeks.

For all of these reasons, the practice among many Ashkenazic Jews today is to refrain from listening to music (at least live music) during the 3 weeks.

Mitigating Factors

There are, however, a number of other factors to consider:

1) There are a host of restrictions similar to those laid out in the baraita above for the days before 9 Av in texts talking about restrictions during the time period after many unsuccessful fasts for rain. R. Hai Gaon (quoted in Ran on Rif Ta'anit 5b) lifted these restrictions in any case where a mitzvah was involved. For instance, he permitted one who had not yet had children to get married during this time, since there is not actually a prohibition against getting married, claims R. Hai Gaon, but rather it is a bad omen to get married during this time, a concern that we override when a more important principle is at stake. Though Beit Yosef has some initial doubts about whether this leniency would apply to the first 9 days of Av as well, he seems to conclude that it does, and Rema indeed rules this way. Arukh Hashulhan indeed rules that if there is some pressing need, we can permit even a marriage during the 3 weeks (though he won't allow it during the actual week during which 9 Av falls). Indeed, many Aharonim extend this principle to permit using musical instruments during this period to celebrate an event like a pidyon haben, which is a celebration surrounding a mitzvah. [See R. Ovadiah Yosef in Yehaveh Da'at 6:34 for more.]

2) Context matters: Peri Megadim rules that a professional musician who plays at Gentile parties is allowed to play during the 3 weeks. Zekher Simhah (R. Simhah Halevi Bamberger) says that a person may take music lessons--at least up until the actual week during which 9 Av falls--since this is not really playing music for joy but learning a trade. [This view is endorsed by, among others, R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg in Tzitz Eliezer 16:19.]

3) The State of Israel and living in a free democratic society that is deeply different from many exilic communities Jews have found themselves in throughout the ages: As noted above, there is strong basis for arguing that the fast of 17 Tammuz (and perhaps even 9 Av) have become optional in a reality where there is once again Jewish sovereignty in the land of Israel. Since the loss of that sovereignty was arguably the impetus for the establishment of the fasts in the first place, its restoration clearly has something to say about how these fasts are observed today. Of course, that political sovereignty is imperfect and incomplete, and it is an equally valid view of history to say that the fasts remain in full effect even today. Anyone who feels that the fasts themselves have become optional will obviously feel the same way about the rituals and practices that have grown up around them. Even those who do not subscribe to a reading of history that obviates these fasts in our contemporary reality may still argue that Jews living in parts of the Diaspora that are unlike the dominant Jewish experience of Exile (such as the contemporary United States) ought to return to observances grounded in the Talmud rather than those that sprung up in medieval Europe in response to conditions of Jewish life there. That would mean whittling down the ban on haircutting to the week of 9 Av and permitting parties and music any time before the month of Av.

[Another interesting practice, with its own history: Sefer Hasidim #840 states that one should not say a שהחיינו during the 3 weeks, reflecting a sense that a sense of gratitude for coming to “this time” is inappropriate during such a mournful period. Maharil Responsum #31, however, only accepts this in cases where one could later say the שהחיינו, as in the case of a new piece of clothing or a seasonal fruit, but rejects the notion that we would drop the recitation of a שהחיינו over a mitzvah that happens to fall in that period, such as a pidyon haben (redemption of the first-born son). The Vilna Gaon, among others, rejected this whole stringency and said שהחיינו should be said in this period. This debate is a fascinating meditation on the tensions between living in a mythic past while still engages with the pleasures, responsibilities and miracles of the present.]

I hope this is a meaningful period of time for all of you. May we see the arrival of complete peace and redemption in our day.

שנזכה לראות בנחמת ירושלים

Waiting for Nightfall to Begin Shavuot

2011-05-26T15:49:00.001-04:00

by Rabbi Ethan Tucker

Sifra Emor Parashah 10 Perek 12:6 considers the question of whether Sefirat Haomer is to be performed during the day and concludes that, though the Korban Haomer is indeed brought during the day—the verse says “מיום הביאכם”, “from the day that you bring”—we must count at night in order to fulfill the imperative of seven “whole” weeks. By counting at night, we include the entire first day (and subsequent days) in the count and respect the wholeness of this unit. This text is cited on Bavli Menahot 66a.

Tosafot there (s.v. זכר) comment on the fact that later Babylonian Amoraim seem to have treated Sefirat Haomer as being only of rabbinic authority in the absence of the Temple and recommends therefore that one should actually try to count the Omer during twilight: 1) We need not wait until true darkness has set in, since we can treat the doubtful period of twilight leniently in the context of a rabbinic mitzvah, and 2) counting before it is truly dark will better underscore the “temimut” of each day. However, a later voice in that Tosafot rejects this reasoning.

Out of this conceptual framework emerged the idea of delaying kiddush on the first night of Shavuot until nightfall, so as not to impinge on the wholeness of the 49 days of the Omer. R. Avraham Horowitz (16^th c. Poland, student of Rema) is the first to cite this practice, in the name of R. Ya’akov Falk, in his work Emek Berakhah. In this work, he explicitly defends davening early, since we see in the gemara that one can pray the Amidah for motzaei Shabbat before the end of Shabbat.

Probably bothered by the fact that the gemara also permits making havdalah before the end of Shabbat—without a candle—R. David b. Shmuel Halevi, (17^th c. Poland) in his Magen David on the Shulhan Arukh, recommends delaying Arvit on the first night of Shavuot as well so that the 49 days can be completed. R. Eilyahu b. Binyamin Shapira (17^th c. Bohemia, Prague) seems resistant to this extension, probably because it was not practiced in his community. It is not at all clear how widely this extension caught on in Poland either, at least right away. One can imagine that it was much more difficult to delay Arvit until nightfall than to ask people to make kiddush after nightfall once they had returned home.

There are several grounds for being lenient, however:

R. Yosef b. Pinhas Selgmann (17^th c. Germany) was unhappy about this new custom, whose influence clearly had begun to make itself felt on his community. In Yosif Ometz #850 he points out that none of the great authorities in his community ever worried about this, particularly not those who would stay up to learn all night, since there would be virtually no time to have dinner and rejoicing with one’s family before beginning a serious study session. [Remember how late nightfall is in northern Europe in the middle of the summer.] He therefore says that one is certainly permitted to make kiddush after sunset, since that is already considered nighttime. He does address the question of davening late and it seems that practice had not caught on.

Degel Mahaneh Efraim rejected the entire custom, citing the Tosafot on Pesahim 99b (s.v. עד שתחשך), who seem explicitly to reveal complete lack of knowledge of such a custom.

R. Yaakov Emden (18^th c. Germany) writes in his siddur that being careful about this custom is truly unnecessary, as it is based on a weak inference by later authorities and therefore even if one wants to worry about it, he can restrict his concern to kiddush, given that that was the original custom.

R. David Tzvi Hoffman prefers fulfilling the tradition of starting late but allows saying kiddush after sunset if need be, on the theory that if Sefirat Haomer is today only of rabbinic authority—as mentioned above, though the Rambam (Hilkhot Temidin U’Musafin 7:22-24) seems to disagree—then one can treat twilight leniently with respect to “temimut.” [This is indeed the position of the Ittur (Matzah Umaror 137a) and R. Nissim of Gerona with respect to other practices relating to “temimut.”]

R. Ovadiah Yosef seems to disregard the ban on early davening and is very lenient about early kiddush, particularly for those living in high latitudes.

The custom does, however, have some aesthetic advantages to it all other things being equal, and is a nice way of further encouraging attentiveness to the astronomical rhythms of the world we so often get alienated from. I see no real basis for distinguishing between Arvit and kiddush. However, if there are any obstacles to following the practice, I think the history above is sufficient to show that there are good grounds for being lenient.

Is it permissible to interrupt the reading of the Megillah with explanations and other thematic expansions on the story?

2011-03-17T15:19:00.006-04:00

Question: Is it permissible to interrupt the reading of the Megillah with explanations and other thematic expansions on the story?

I should note off the bat that the most logical solution for a crowd that would require English explanations is to have a Megillah written in English that is read in English. For various reasons, probably both good and bad, even many non-knowledgeable people prefer a mystical experience in an exotic language they barely or don’t understand to a more transparent ritual in the vernacular. There are halakhic issues as well, though in my view, a Megillah written in the vernacular except for those words like האחשתרנים בני הרמכים and other phrases whose meaning remains uncertain even in the JPS translation could be read by someone who does not understand Hebrew to fulfill the obligations of others and not run afoul of Beit Yosef’s discussion of this in 690:10-11. I would rely on that view in a situation like this, despite the feelings of some Aharonim to the contrary (see MB there) given the importance of connecting an entire community that otherwise might get nothing out of the experience. But since there isn’t such a Megillah and people probably wouldn’t want this anyway, let’s go back to the original question.

A much more thorough treatment of הפסק in general is needed, but I hope this can be a basic frame to think about this issue.

The overarching question here is obviously about preserving the integrity of certain ritual units and has at least two dimensions: 1) Maintaining continuity between recitation of the berakhah and performance of the associated act; 2) Maintaining the unified integrity of the act itself.

With respect to the first question, it seems fairly universally assumed that there should not be a break between a berakhah and the act with which it is associated. [Some interpretations ground this in Shmuel’s statement on Pesahim 7b and parallels that one must make berakhot prior to performing mitzvot. The exact meaning of this statement is not entirely clear, however, particularly with respect to where the legal emphasis is. See also parallel at Yerushalmi Berakhot 9:3, 14a for different attributions.] A number of discussions address what to do if there is nonetheless some sort of interruption.

On Berakhot 40a, a series of Amoraim debate what sorts of interruptions between המוציא and eating the bread can be tolerated such that one need not repeat the berakhah. The final word is had by R. Sheshet, who says that directing others to eat, asking for salt or some other condiment or even ordering someone to prepare food for the animals do not constitute serious enough interruptions to warrant repeating the berakhah. [Halakhot Gedolot points out that all of this is only בדיעבד; ideally a person should not interrupt at all. Indeed, this is supported by Tosafot’s feeling on 39b that even the silent cutting of bread is something we try to avoid as much as possible between the berakhah and the act of eating.]

A similar discussion with respect to a ברכת המצוה is reported on Menahot 36a, where R. Hisda rules that if one speaks between putting on the תפילה של יד and the תפילה של ראש, one must make the berakhah over the של יד again. [There is then an intervening discussion leading to the famous Rashi/R. Tam dispute about whether one or two berakhot are assumed here.] It is possible that any speaking would invalidate the berakhah and that mitzvot must be even more tightly connected to their berakhot, but Rashi, wanting to harmonize this text with the previous passage, assumes that the speech here is unconnected to the mitzvah at hand and thus wipes out the berakhah. The considerations, however, are the same as we saw above. [Tosafot assume the legal parallelism as well.]

This would then mean that one should always avoid any kind of interruption—even a significant silent delay—between making a berakhah and beginning the associated act, though there is room to be lenient with certain kinds of interruptions that are sufficiently connected to the act at hand such that the integrity of the berakhah-act unit is preserved.

The second concern is a bit different and concerns the integrity of the act itself. Let’s begin with the general question of interrupting the Megillah. The major Tannaitic paradigm for thinking about interrupting lengthy mitzvot is Mishnah Berakhot 2:1, which engages situations of intitiating conversation or responding during Keriat Shema. The normative view follows R. Yehudah (though see Massekhet Soferim 20:7 for an apparent holding like R. Meir) who says that normally one can only interrupt Shema and its blessings in order to initiate conversation מפני היראה and to respond מפני הכבוד (a lower standard). At certain major break points, however, one can initiate conversation מפני הכבוד and respond to anyone at all. It must be emphasized that these interruptions are assumed to have nothing to do with the reading of Shema. One could imagine something that was somehow related—such as saying berakhot over tefillin just dscovered and donned during the Shema—might be treated more leniently. [See Tosafot on 14b.]

On 14a, R. Hiyya says about Hallel and Megillah that פוסק ואין בכך כלום. This would seem to be an application of the Mishnah’s regulations on Shema to these rituals, dispelling the possible notion that they might need even more integrity in order to be effective heralds of their associated miracles. Nonetheless, the מפני הכבוד/מפני היראה considerations would apply. But R. Hiyya’s strident language might also suggest a more radical view that there simply is no issue of הפסק in the middle of the megillah at all, or at certain dividing points. [See R. Yonah there on this last point.] Yerushalmi Berakhot 2:1, 4b possibly suggests that Hallel and the Megillah, because they are consecutive texts (unlike Shema) would be treated under the more stringent rubric of באמצע, such that one would always need a standard of מפני היראה to initiate and מפני הכבוד to respond. But Rabbah on Bavli Berakhot 14a explicilty refers to the “chapter breaks” (not clear what these are historically before Christian chapter numbers) in Hallel as well and gives these significance. It seems pretty clear that Rabbah is expounding on the guidelines laid out by R. Hiyya, and even if not, his ruling is followed by Rif and almost everyone else. One could, however, read R. Hiyya as more lenient and rule like him, or suggest—but without very good conceptual basis—that we are more lenient with Megillah than with Hallel. [The story regarding Ravina at the end of the sugya is actually difficult with either reading.]

The more radical reading seems to be adopted by Ittur Aseret Hadibrot Megillah, p. 114a, where he suggests that given that the last berakhah following the reading is not truly obligatory, the Megillah reading is not sandwiched between ritual requirements such that we have to worry about breaking an uninterrupted flow from the first berakhah to the last berakhah, He therefore concludes that there is no issue at all with speaking during the megillah reading (provided one hears all the words). Tur rejects this, saying that communities that do say the berakhah at the end must treat it like a single unit that ought not to be interrupted. Many other rishonim follow this approach as well, (see R. Yonah, Rosh Megillah 2:2 and Hullin 6:6 and Riaz) and Shiltei Gibborim also seems to reject the Ittur’s approach.

The Ittur’s position is thus largely rejected, even though it is possible to ground it in a tenable reading of Berakhot 14a. It is therefore really only useful as a סניף להקל within a larger argument. So let’s return to the specific parameters of this question, which involves not just any interruption, but something topical intended to enhance the reading of the Megillah. Mishnah Megillah 2:2 reads: היה...דורשה...אם כיון לבו יצא ואם לאו לא יצא, indicating that oral interruptions within the Megillah do not necessarily void the reading. The main question for interpreting this Mishnah, however, is whether it assumes that it is permitted לכתחילה to interrupt with a דרשה assuming that there is proper intent during the reading of the actual Megillah text, or whether this is only tolerated בדיעבד. [Let me just note right here that if we are truly dealing with an audience that will simply be unable to connect with the Megillah reading unless there is some explanatory and expository material interspersed, then we can certainly consider that to be a בדיעבד case. Given that this seems to be the basis for the question, the Mishnah closes the case. Note the comment in Noda Biyehudah I:41 to this effect regarding בדיקת חמץ: since it is impossible for a person to sit in one place the entire time from בדיקת חמץ until שעת הביעור, the rules of בדיעבד apply and we allow someone to travel even great distances during that period even though we would normally forbid this לכתחילה during performance of a mitzvah. The same can be applied to people who simply cannot follow a reading that long in Hebrew. Nonetheless, the other sources I will cite help define parameters for thinking about this issue more broadly.]

Yerushalmi Megillah 2:2, 73a weighs in on this question with the following line: ודורשה ובלבד שלא יפליג עצמו לעניינות אחרים. The language of שלא יפליג, as opposed to והוא שלא הפליג suggests an assumption that it is permitted לכתחילה to engage in these sorts of homiletical insertions, with the important proviso that they remain relevant and not lead one astray into other topics. Rashba Megillah 18b entertains the possibility that the Yerushalmi is only speaking בדיעבד, but seems to come down on the side of this being a לכתחילה instruction. In any event, he clearly holds that topical interruptions are permissible לכתחילה and Ritva there is emphatic about this holding. Rosh Megillah 2:1 also initially entertains the notion that derashot are only permitted בדיעבד, but cites the Yerushalmi as unequivocally being לכתחילה and he and Rashba have a text that applies this ruling to a public reading of the Megillah as well. Tur 690 uses language that evokes the Yerushalmi suggesting that he also holds this way. [See Noda Biyehudah’s different reading of Rosh here in Teshuvot I:41, which I disagree with, and even he seems to back off of it. Note also that he likely did not see the Rashba and Ritva I just cited. See there generally for more on our topic.] SA 690:13 is clearly permissive: וכן אם היה דורשה, שקורא פסוק במגילה שלימה ודורשו, אם כיון לבו לצאת י"ח, יצא; ולא יפסיק בה בענינים אחרים, כשדורשה, שאסור להפסיק בה בענינים אחרים. The clear implication is that it is permitted to interrupt the reading with relevant material. MB there defines this as anything that is מעניינו של יום. Note that all of these authorities agree that, provided there was proper intent for the actual reading of the Megillah, even non-topical interruptions do not void the reading בדיעבד. [If any given interruption is as long as it would take to read the entire Megillah, one would begin to get some dissenting views, like Yereim, but even then, all of the authorities just mentioned think the reading is valid בדיעבד. See Rosh Hullin 6:6 for confirmation that this is his view as well. For more on the Rashba’s general analysis of הפסק, which is very helpful for thinking about these issues in general, see his Teshuvot I:244.]

My own bottom line feeling is that one should avoid all interruptions between the berakhah and the beginning of the reading and then urge those responsible to be sure than all other interruptions are truly topical and don’t lead people to thinking about unrelated topics. But anything that will help people focus on the reading and get more out of it is permissible לכתחילה. One should also know that if for some reason there are completely irrelevant interruptions, the reading is still valid בדיעבד.

There is one other concern I have, which pertains to all forms of davening geared towards beginners. I think it is very important to avoid making decisions that inexorably lock people into the role of novice in Jewish life. Arguably, you don’t ever want to run a shul where a more knowledgeable person will walk in and feel estranged from a service she feels is simply not geared towards her. That is the great virtue of having a learner’s service where these more creative things are done, such that people can eventually “graduate” to a more intense version of the ritual that presumes more facility and knowledge. But even in a community where everyone is a learner and the main service has to be in a more introductory mode, I would urge you and others to think about a multi-year plan for getting to a point where there is a reading that is not geared towards beginners as part of a larger vision of getting the community to that more advanced stage. Otherwise, people who actually advance will feel that they have graduated the shul and the community, which will be a loss for everyone.

Hilkhot Purim

2011-03-16T11:24:00.000-04:00

In honor of Purim, please enjoy the following compilation of the Halakhah Think Tank's articles related to Ta'anit Esther and Purim:

Can one who is not fasting lead davenning on a fast day? (July 2009)

Can a Jerusalemite read the Megillah elsewhere on the 14th? (in Hebrew) (May 2009)

Seudat Purim on Friday (March 2008)

Asarah B’Tevet (The 10th of Tevet)

2010-12-13T22:32:00.006-05:00

by Rabbi Ethan Tucker

Already in the wake of the destruction of the First Temple, there was a fast in the tenth month, the month we now call Tevet. This fast is mentioned without a specific day of the month in Zekhariah 8:19. This seems to have been connected to the beginning of the siege of Jerusalem laid by the Babylonian king Nevukhadnetzar on the 10^th day of the tenth month, an event and date reported in II Melakhim 25:1, Jeremiah 52:4, and Yehezkel 24:1.

[This connection is affirmed by R. Akiva in Tosefta Sotah 6:10. But in Tosefta Sotah 6:11, Rabbi preserves an alternate view that this fast refers to the 5^th of Tevet, the date when the Babylonian exilic community heard of the destruction of the First Temple, as recorded in Yehezkel 33:21. See also Bavli Rosh Hashanah 18b. Nonetheless, R. Akiva’s view dominates all subsequent conversation and practice and the 10^th of Tevet becomes the fast day marked by all subsequent generations.]

Zekhariah chapters 7 and 8 are largely devoted the question of whether the “fast of the fifth month”—known to us as Tish’a B’Av—remains relevant once the Second Temple has been rebuilt. After a group asks whether the fast should still be observed, lengthy prophecies are reported to Zechariah with two main points: 1) God was never that interested in the fast day in the first place and is equally uninterested in the question of its abrogation. God is mainly interested in the construction of a just society where the weak are protected and corruption is rooted out. 2) The four fast days (known to us as Tzom Gedaliah, Asara B’Tevet, Shiv’a Asar B’Tammuz and Tish’a B’Av) will be a time of rejoicing. Whether this is to take place in the present or in the future is left unclear.

Picking up on this answer, the Talmud Bavli on Rosh Hashanah 18a-b has a short sugya that tries to lay out a framework for these fast days and their potential status as days of rejoicing. The bottom line that emerges is this: 1) In a time of shalom, these days are ones of rejoicing (on which it would seem to be forbidden to fast). 2) In a time of shemad (persecution/suffering), these days are mandatory fast days. 3) In a time covered by neither of the above categories, three of these fasts are optional (though unclear if individuals or communities decide). Tish’a B’Av remains mandatory.

The success of political Zionism as manifested in the founding of the State of Israel has raised serious questions with regard to the status of these fasts. Some have argued that the restoration of full Jewish political sovereignty over the land of Israel has returned us to category 1) and thus all of these fast days—including Tish’a B’Av—have been canceled and are now days of celebration. Others have maintained that while we might not describe ourselves as living in a time of shalom (for all the obvious reasons that political Zionism has not completely solved issues of Jewish sovereignty and independence and because of a great deal of ongoing persecution and war in the context of both the Jewish community and the global community beyond it), we certainly don’t live in a time of shemad, and the founding of the State of Israel is certainly significant enough to upend the medieval consensus for mandatory observance and return us to the purer optional status of category 3). Among those who take an optional stance, there are many who have advocated fasting half a day and breaking the fast after Minhah. Still others have argued that until some dramatic sign of shalom—on the messianic/apocalyptic order of magnitude of the rebuilding of a Third Temple or its equivalent—we remain with the medieval consensus that these days are fully mandatory.

This is a complex topic. You can listen to a shiur on this topic here and the key sources are here.

It therefore seems to me that we are best described as living in category 3), where the fast days other than Tish’a B’Av are optional, and I personally do not feel that there is any formal obligation to fast on the other three fast days. So why do I fast and why does Yeshivat Hadar choose to observe these days as fast days in terms of our liturgy and our practice? There are, to my mind, two compelling reasons: First, there is much injustice and imperfection in the world in general, as well as in the sovereign Jewish state we are blessed with today. These days and their fasting ritual are a powerful way to trigger us to think about those issues. Second, Zekhariah tells us that these days will one day be ones of rejoicing. That means that they must be maintained on the calendar so that the Jewish people will remember them when history takes the turn that will enable us to see the world as one infused with shalom. I have personally committed to be among those that guard that calendrical space for the future and I think it is most appropriate for yoshvei beit hamidrash—those who spend the lion’s share of their time learning from the Jewish past and its application to the Jewish future to be among those who assume that road.

Those communities fasting on Asarah B’Tevet mark the day with the special Torah reading for fast days, both at Shaharit and at Minhah, and there is a special Haftarah at Minhah as well. Other distinctive features to the davening, such as avinu malkeinu, feature the themes of the day as well. Some include Selihot in the morning as well.

The fast is begun at dawn (5:45 AM in New York City). One who goes to sleep with the intention of waking up before that time to eat breakfast may do so. One who simply wakes up early not having intended to eat in the morning may not. The fast concludes at nightfall (5:04 PM in New York City; but see below for this year’s unusual Friday fast). No restrictions associated with 9 Av and Yom Kippur other than eating and drinking need be observed.

Friday: When Asarah B’Tevet falls on a Friday, tefillot are conducted exactly as they would be on any other day of the week, except that at Minhah, Avinu Malkeinu and Tahanun are omitted.

With respect to the conclusion of the fast, a dilemma emerges: Mishnah Megillah 1:3 clarifies that when 9 Av falls on Shabbat, it is pushed off to Sunday; this aversion to fasting on Shabbat would seem to extend to all other public fasts as well, with the exception of Yom Kippur. [Note an unusual claim in R. David Abudraham that if 10 Tevet fell on Shabbat, it would also be observed on Shabbat, but Rashi on Megillah 5a disagrees and Beit Yosef OH 550 rejects this view.] This flags a general tension between fasting and Shabbat that raises the question of how to deal with a Friday fast. Such a fast, if completed until nightfall, will extend into Shabbat. Should the fast be completed until nightfall, in keeping with the integrity of the day? Or does the sanctity of Shabbat allow for or even require truncating the fast in some way? And if so, is there any integrity to a fast day that is truncated before the end of the day?

Two core texts address this matter:

Mishnah Ta’anit 2:10, R. Meir reports in the name of Rabban Gamliel that when Tish’a B’Av fell on a Friday—[this is no longer possible given current calendrical rules]—the fast would not be completed.

Tosefta Ta’aniyot 2:7 also discusses the case of Tish’a B’Av falling on Friday. R. Yehudah says that a person eats and drinks a small amount before Shabbat so as not to enter into Shabbat in a state of fasting. [In the parallel in the Bavli, R. Yehudah says that he based his view on once seeing R. Akiva force himself to eat something before Shabbat when 9 Av fell on a Friday so as to show people that the law was like R. Yehudah.] R. Yose says the fast is completed even though it runs into Shabbat (which seems to mean that one fasts until nightfall). From the context in the Tosefta, this seems to be a debate spanning the full spectrum of possibility: R. Yehudah requires one to eat before Shabbat begins, but R. Yose also requires one to fast into Shabbat and not to cut the fast short.

In Yerushalmi Ta’anit 2:14, 66ab, Rav is quoted as siding with R. Yose’s position in the Tosefta, and mandating the completion of the fast of Tish’a B’Av into the time of Shabbat. This view is also reflected in Bavli Eruvin 40b-41b, where both Rav and Ulla rule this way as well. [Rav is cited as explicitly rejecting Rabban Gamliel’s position. The Gemara states that R. Yose’s opinion over time gained dominance over that of Rabban Gamliel cited in the Mishnah.] The sugya there ends with a public ruling in the name of R. Huna that one completes the fast, which seems also to refer to siding with R. Yose over R. Yehudah with respect to Tish’a B’Av falling on a Friday.

On Eruvin 40b, Rabbah reports a question: does one who takes on an optional fast on a Friday complete the fast into Shabbat or do they cut it short in anticipation of Shabbat? [This question is answered clearly in the Yerushalmi: the fast is completed into Shabbat. But note the tradition recorded in Megillat Ta’anit that frowns on electively choosing to fast on Friday.] Rava appeals to the R. Yose’s position in the Tosefta above to resolve this question, assuming that the rule for an individual fast ought to be the same as for a public fast like 9 Av. From a historical perspective, it seems fairly clear that by Rabbah and Rava’s time, the question with regard to 9 Av had been definitively resolved. Therefore, Rabbah’s question seems to be entertaining the possibility that an elective fast might be treated more leniently, and the Gemara concludes that it cannot; it too must last until nightfall into Shabbat. Alternatively, it is possible that the question here is more radical: Do we follow R. Yehudah on individual fast days and actually forbid fasting into Shabbat, or do we permit individuals who want to to fast until nightfall on Friday night? Under this reading, the sugya’s conclusion would merely be that it is permissible to fast until nightfall, but by no means obligatory.

A number of positions emerge from this material in the rishonim:

1) Tosafot on Eruvin 41b explain R. Yose according to the latter reading above: it is permitted to fast into Friday night, but even he agrees that it is not obligatory. Moreover, they extend this reading into the core holding on 9 Av. Therefore, there is never an obligation to complete a fast on Friday and it may be broken before Shabbat. Ri is reported to have publicly broken his fast before the onset of Shabbat one year when 10 Tevet fell on a Friday. This view does not specify how early one can break the fast; it would seem to be an allowance to eat enough sufficiently in advance of Shabbat (i.e. not just 30 seconds before), so that one does not enter Shabbat feeling ravenous.

2) Maharam of Rothenberg adopts a softer version of the above: one who has accepted Shabbat early, as one who prays Arvit before it is dark, may eat before nightfall when it is a fast day on Friday. One could thus begin Shabbat as early as P’lag Haminhah (just under 1 hour before sunset in the winter in New York City, 3:32 PM this year) and then eat right after Arvit. [This reflects Maharil’s tradition regarding Maharam; the version of Maharam reported in Tashbetz Katan may be slightly stricter, possibly advocating waiting until at least sunset. See Bah OH 249.]

3) Ra’avad (cited in Rashba and many others) ruled that the requirement to complete the fast was only to forbid eating before Shabbat (as Ri did), but once the sun has set, one may break the fast immediately and not wait until nightfall, since it is Shabbat and one may not fast on Shabbat. [See also Tosafot Avodah Zarah 34a for a possible antecedent to this view.] He does not explicitly address the case of one who accepts Shabbat early, but it seems he is stricter than the second view above.

4) Ra’aviah holds (along with others) that one must complete all fasts, private and public, until nightfall, even if they fall out on a Friday.

Rosh, though he accepts Maharam’s position in principle, rules that one who does not mentally note that one will end the fast early has an obligation to complete the fast into Shabbat and until nightfall. This is essentially an adoption of Maharam’s view as an option to be exercised, with Ra’aviah’s position serving as the default.

Two positions emerge that attempt to distinguish between private and public fasts: Maharil Responsa #157 reports his own practice as following Maharam for elective fasts and following Ra’aviah for public fasts. But he is explicit that he thinks either option is valid to choose for either. R. Yeroham is stricter: He thinks that one may not exercise Maharam as an option for a public fast day and must complete it until nightfall.

Rema endorses a purer version of Maharam that prefers but does not require advance acceptance and recommends eating before nightfall, but then reports Maharil’s personal practice as the common standard for public fasts (essentially following R. Yeroham). Shulhan Arukh rules like Rosh, requiring explicit acceptance of a truncated fast in order to eat after Arvit and before nightfall. Kaf Hahayim is clear that one may use this mechanism for a public fast as well, though R. Ovadiah Yosef reads R. Yeroham into the Shulhan Arukh here and claims that, according to the Shulhan Arukh, public fasts must always be completed until nightfall (even though he rules that elective fasts may be ended immediately after Arvit.

In our own time, it would seem that the answer to this question will be determined by how one regards the status of 10 Tevet in our day. Obviously, those who view the fast today as elective and choose not to fast (or those who view it as forbidden to fast) will not do so. But among those who do fast, there are two basic possibilities:

1) Those who consider 10 Tevet to be fully obligatory should fast until nightfall, following Maharil as reflected in Rema, though there is room for those with no tradition in this regard to follow Rosh as reflected in Kaf Hahayim’s interpretation of the Shulhan Arukh. The latter view allows one to state on Thursday afternoon that one only intends to fast until the end of Arvit on Friday night and then one may eat even before nightfall, as early as Plag Haminhah. But if one forgot to state this explicitly on Thursday, one should complete the fast until nightfall.

2) Those who consider 10 Tevet as elective, but choose to fast, should state on Thursday afternoon that they only intend to fast until the end of Arvit on Friday night and then may eat even before nightfall. According to Rema, it is desirable to eat before nightfall in this case, and even if one forgot to commit to this on Thursday, one may/should still end the fast after Arvit, as early as Plag Haminhah. [There are other sources that explore the possibility of a half-day fast on elective fasts; see SA OH 562. That could potentially be employed here as well, but that is beyond the scope of this post.]

Niddah: Textual Exploration and Open Conversation

2010-10-19T16:01:00.000-04:00

This past week, we held Part 1 of Niddah: Textual Exploration and Open Conversation, a lecture series taught by Rabbi Ethan Tucker. Part 2 is tonight at Yeshivat Hadar. You can also watch live here. More information about this series as well as source materials are on our website.

Part 1 can be viewed below.

Egalitarianism, Tefillah and Halakhah

2009-10-20T15:49:00.000-04:00

The file below addresses issues arising out of egalitarian tefillah from within a halakhic discourse.
Final Egalitarianism Paper

Leader Eating on a Fast Day

2009-07-17T12:30:00.000-04:00

Question: Can one who is not fasting on lead davenning on a fast day?

Answer:

A baraita on Shabbat 24a (see also Tosefta Berakot 3:10) states that one should include material relevant for fast days at Arvit, Shaharit and Minhah of fast days. This seems to be something like the עננו paragraph said even today on fast days in the Amidah. Similarly, Yerushalmi Ta'anit 2:2 reports R. Huna saying that one must mention even individual, elective fast days both at night and during the day in one's Amidah. A Geonic tradition (Otzar Hageonim Shabbat Responsa #76) rules that the inclusion of this material, while mandatory in Minhah, is optional in Arvit and Shaharit, without explanation. Rashi reports a Geonic tradition that goes further: we don't include this material in Arvit and Shaharit, for fear that the person saying it will not complete the fast and will end up having lied about it being a fast day. Only at Minhah (which, seemingly, is said towardds the end of the day) do we feel confident enough to complete the fast such that we say what we know as עננו. In the end, common practice has engaged a kind of compromise position: the leader on a fast day says עננו as a separate blessing during the repetition in both Shaharit and Minhah (there being no repetition at Arvit), while individuals only include it at Minhah.

This last tradition seems to take a clear stand that one who is not fasting certainly cannot say עננו and would thus seem to preclude someone who is not fasting from leading on a fast day.

Indeed, a Geonic tradition cited first in the name of R. Yehudai Gaon (see Otzar Hageonim Ta'anit Responsa #58-59) states that one who is not fasting should not lead on a fast day, because the person cannot honestly say עננו--"answer us"--because the person is not fasting. Tur disagrees with this ruling and says that there is no reason that a person cannot say עננו ביום תענית הזה--"on this fast day", as opposed to "our" or "my"--even if not fasting, given that it is indeed a fast day in the community. [Tur might maintain the Geonic tradition above regarding not saying עננו in Arvit and Shaharit and its implication that one not fasting should never say עננו as being about individual fast days; communal fast days have a reality to them that transcends the individual and thus even those not fasting can talk about them litrugically as fast days.] Tur ends up concluding that it is preferable to have someone who is fasting as shatz, but clearly allows being lenient, such as if there is no one else prepared to do it. We might add that one could also be lenient if feelings would be severely hurt.

In any event, Beit Yosef backs away from this and returns to the ruling of the Geonim that one who eats is disbarred from leading on a fast day, and so he rules in the Shulhan Arukh in OH 566:5.

Magen Avraham merely notes that if the non-faster already began leading, we can take a compromise position between Tur and SA: have the leader say עננו ביום צום התענית הזה in שומע תפלה (where individuals add it in Minhah), as opposed to adding it in between the seventh and eighth berakhot, where the leader normally adds it. That way, we don't add an entirely new berakhah into the repetition, in case SA really takes a hard line on this issue, but we can rely on the Tur's logic not to consider such a statement to be a lie. It does seem, however that MA would not want you to say תעניתנו, feeling that to be dishonest, but rather ביים צום התענית הזה. [Note that Hayyei Adam understood the Magen Avraham to permit adding עננו as its own berakhah in this case, outright relying on the Tur if the person already started leading.]

With regard to Yom Kippur, it is noteworthy that the only axis of concern in the debate seems to be the truthfulness of saying עננו when not fasting. The Yom Kippur liturgy features no such statements and the leader is thus never in a position of acting as if s/he is fasting even though s/he is not. Having someone who is justified in eating on Yom Kippur lead thus does not seem to present any of these issues.

Following the Shulhan Arukh, one should never plan to have someone who is not fasting lead on a fast day, and even on Yom Kippur, where the issues raised here do not apply, one should think carefully about what sort of exemplar one wants leading the community on a day when almost everyone else in the room is fasting. It seems strongly preferable to have someone as a leader who is joining the community in that experience and can thus emotionally connect with them in this regard. Even if this means that pregnant and nursing women order to eat and drink minimally by their doctors--without such an order, pregnant and nursing women have the same fasting obligation as anyone else--cannot lead during those years of childbirth, having a leader in sync with the community's practice on that day seems a strong value. But because Yom Kippur is different, perhaps there is more room to be flexible with someone who already accepted a paid position or a pregnant woman ordered to eat by her doctor who a) did not know she would be pregnant when she accepted the position or b) will be drinking in such small quantities throughout the day (which she should ideally be doing anyway, even if ordered to drink), that she will still meaningfully experience Yom Kippur as a fast day.

Certainly, if someone was already assigned the position of leading and it is impossible to replace them, either for lack of someone else qualified or for fear of shaming someone, then one can rely on the Tur to let them lead on a fast day and certainly on Yom Kippur, where arguably no one thinks there is a core problem. Otherwise, one should make every effort to only choose prayer leaders on fast days who are themselves fasting.

The Matrilineal Principle and Jewish Identity

2009-07-16T12:37:00.000-04:00

What is commonly known today as the matrilineal principle is actually two principles rolled into one:

1) The child of a Gentile father and a Jewish mother is unambiguously a Jew.
2) The child of a Jewish father and a Gentile mother is unambiguously a Gentile.

These two halves of the commonly assumed simple truth, "Jewish status follows the mother", have histories of their own that are relevant for how one approaches this issue today.

In the Bible, there is no evidence of a matrilineal principle. Numerous sources indicate that an Israelite man who fathered a child with a non-Israelite woman could expect that child to be a part of the Israelite nation. There does seem to have been some possible stigma associated with that child--non-Israelite mothers are often singled out for mention--but no sense that they were outside of the Israelite community. For the most part, it seems safe to assume that the children of non-Israelite men and Israelite women were generally lost to the Israelite community given the patriarchal realities of the ancient world. The case of the son of an Egyptian man and an Israelite woman in Vayikra 24 seems to be the exception that proves the rule: this character unusually ended up with the Israelite community as a result of the Exodus; normally, such a person woudl not be part of the Israelite community.

The first inkling we get of any sort of matrilineal approach is in the book of Ezra, where a figure known as Shekhaniah, a "son of Elam", proposes to Ezra that all of the returning exiles who have taken foreign wives cast away those wives and their children, causing them to leave the community. While the need for this edict only underscores that these people would, by default prior to this event, have been considered part of the Israelite community, this measure does seem to mark the beginning of a policy treating the children of Gentile women as Gentiles.

This approach is crystallized in a clear rulingin Mishnah Kiddushin, which states that a Gentile woman produces Gentile offspring. Even this ruling met with some popular resistance, however. A few centuries later we have evidence of some in the Jewish community of Tyre wanting to circumcise such children on Shabbat, revealing their sense that "patrilineal" Jews ought to have been a part of the Jewish community. The rabbinic repsonse is fierce and clear: Such a child is a Gentile, in keeping with the Mishnah's ruling. We will see however, that the feeling that patrilineal Jews are not identical to other Gentiles resurfaces later on.

On the question of the children of Gentile father's and Jewish mothers, classical rabbinic sources are divided, and a debate persists for centuries. Some sources--including the Mishnah--argue that such a child is a mamzer, a Jew, fully obligated in mitzvot, but forbidden from marrying Jews of untainted lineage. (A mamzer can legally marry only another mamzer or a convert, who also lacks pure Jewish lineage.) Others maintain the Jewishness of said matrilineal child, while either lowering the level of lineal taint--such as forbidding a daughter from such a union to marry a kohen--or claiming that no taint exists whatsoever. Rabbinic stories about such matrilineal children are suffused with a sense of liminality and conflict, with rabbis at war amongs themselves (and sometimes even with themselves) as to how to treat such children. Finally, some classical rabbinic sources may open the possibility that that the child of a Gentile father and a Jewish mother is in fact a Gentile, though if this person were to convert, they would be free of any lineal taint of mamzerut.

The Babylonian Talmud's latest opinion on this matter is to reject mamzerut for matrilineal Jews.and seemingly to embrace them as full Jews (possibly with the restrictions on marrying a kohen), and the opinion that they are full Jews comes to dominate and is the ruling of the Shulhan Arukh many centuries later. But other medieval and modern voices rejected this path and maintained that a matrilineal child is in fact a Gentile in need of conversion. Sources in the 19th century continue to advance this claim, even as opposing sources try to crack down on this perspective and embrace matrilineal Jews as full, unambiguous Jews.

As noted earlier, the ruling that patrilineal Jews are in need of conversion is much less controversial and accepted as black-letter law by all rabbinic authorities after the Mishnah. However, modern rabbis, including R. Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer and R. Ben Zion Uzziel have argued--based on a close reading of a number of Talmudic passages--for the classification of patrilineal Jews as zera yisrael, still of Jewish stock, such that their conversion--unlike that of their purely Gentile counterparts--is truly a reclaiming of roots and therefore to be encouraged. In other words, while conversion is still required, these authorities understand that the process is metaphysically different from that of a Gentile coming to Judaism without any genetic connection.

All of this material opens of the possibility of recognizing, honoring and meeting the challenges of ambiguous identity presented to those with one Jewish and one Gentile parent. While the halakhic conversation has clearly gone in a direction that fundamentally treats matrilineal Jews as Jews and patrilineal Jews as Gentiles, there is actually much more ambiguity here than is typically acknowledged Once could imagine a model in which the standards for conversion for patrilineal Jews are dramatically lowered as they are welcomed to embrace their Jewish identity without ambivalence or ambiguity as well as demanding/respecting/honoring the need for matriineal Jews to do the same, if not with a full-blown formal conversion, than with an act of immerison in a mikveh in front of a panel of 3 as a way of satisfying the halakhic opinions that require this and being honest about the real choices that confront a person who is confronting the complexity of their own ethnic narrative and inherited faith traditions.

Can a Jerusalemite read the Megillah elsewhere on the 14th?

2009-05-11T13:21:00.001-04:00

אריה ברנשטיין

נשאלת השאלה אם "בני כרך" (דהיינו, בני ירושלים, עיר שמוקפת חומה בימי יהושע בן-נון שבה חוגגים את פורים בט"ו באדר) כשרים לקרוא פרקים ממגילת אסתר במניין של קרוביהם "בני-עיר" (דהיינו תושבי ערים אחרות), ביום פורים שלהם, י"ד דאדר, לכבוד שמחה משפחתית של חגיגת בת-מצווה, במקרה שמתכוונים לחזור לירושלים בו ביום ולחגוג פורים בקהילתם.

הרי הלכה מקובלת היא שבן כרך שהלך לעיר חייב לקרוא בי"ד כבן עיר רק אם היה בעיר בתחילת יום י"ד, היינו, בעלות השחר, וגם שאין דעתו לחזור לעיר מוקפת חומה לפני עלות השחר בט"ו, כמו שכבר סיכם וביאר המשנה ברורה (תרפח ס"ק יב):

"...בן כרך שהלך לעיר אם היה דעתו בעת נסיעתו לחזור למקומו בזמן קריאה דהיינו שיחזור משם בליל י"ד קודם שיאיר היום דהוא זמן קריאה...קוראו כמקומו דהיינו ביום ט"ו אבל אם לא היה בדעתו בעת נסיעתו לחזור משם רק לאחר זמן קריאה דהוא ביום י"ד בבוקר חל עליו חובת הקריאה של העיר וזה שאמר המחבר 'קורא עם אנשי המקום אשר הוא שם'...וכתב הט"ז דכ"ז דוקא אם היה שם בעיר בתחלת היום אבל אם חזר למקומו שהוא כרך קודם היום לא מועיל מה שחשב מתחלה להיות בעיר בעת קריאת העיר."

יש, אמנם, כמה מחלוקות בפרטי העניין, אבל במקרה שבאים שכבר יום ומתכוונים לחזור הביתה בו ביום, אין מי שסובר שחייבים לקרוא שם בי"ד.

לכן, השאלה החשובה בכאן היא האם מי שאינו מחוייב בקריאת המגילה באותו יום מוציא את מי שחייב. הערכים העומדים כאן במתח הם מחד גיסא, מה שלמדנו במשנה (ר"ה ג:ח) "זה הכלל כל שאינו מחויב בדבר אינו מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן", ומאידך גיסא, הברייתא בירושלמי (ברכות ג:ג/ו:ב), "כל מצות שאדם פטור אדם מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן חוץ מברכת המזון"[1], וכפרש"י למקבילו בבבלי, ר"ה כט., "שהרי כל ישראל ערבין זה בזה למצות". מתח זה מתמתח בפוסקים לא רק בענייננו אלא גם בשאלת האם מי ששכח לילה ויום בספירת העומר כשר להוציא את הרבים בספירה; האם בן א"י שנמצא בחו"ל כשר להוציא את הרבים בהלל או תפילה ביו"ט שני של גליות; האם כהן שאינו מתענה בתענית ציבור כשר לעלות לתורה; האם מי שעוד לא קיבל עליו את השבת כשר לקדש על היין בשביל אלה שכבר קבלו עליהם את השבת מבעוד יום, ועוד. המכנה המשותף בין הדיונים האלה הוא השאלה אם אותו אדם שייך לאותה מצוה, ורק במקרה אינו חייב בה כעת, או שבכלל לא שייך לאותה מצוה, כפי שרואים בירושלמי שם:תני כל מצוה שאדם פטור אדם מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן חוץ מברכת המזון.והא (ד)תנינן "כל שאינו חייב בדבר אין מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן". הא אם היה חייב אפי' אם יצא מוציא.זאת אומרת, לפי תירוץ הירושלמי, אם מישהו "אינו חייב בדבר" מפני שכבר קיימו, הוא יכול להוציא אחרים שעוד לא קיימו, אבל אם בכלל אינו חייב במצוה זאת, הוא אינו יכול להוציא אחרים. כזה רואים במשנה מגילה ב:ד (וכמותו בעוד עניינים אחרים): "הכל כשרין לקרות את המגלה, חוץ מחרש, שוטה, וקטן. רבי יהודה מכשיר בקטן", וכך מובא בשו"ע (או"ח תרפט:ב): "אחד הקורא ואחד השומע מן הקורא, יצא ידי חובתו; והוא שישמע ממי שהוא חייב בקריאתה. לפיכך אם היה הקורא חרש או קטן או שוטה, השומע ממנו לא י��א." סיכום הדברים רואים בדברי המאירי (ר"ה כט.) וכמותם גם בראשונים אחרים:

"מה שביארנו שכל שאינו מחוייב בדבר אינו מוציא את הרבים כונת הדברים הוא כל שאינו מחוייב מצד גופו אבל מי שחיוב המצוה הוטלה עליו אלא שיצא ידי חובתו ממנה מוציא את האחרים שאע"פ שיצא ידי עצמו עדין הוא ערב בשל חבירו שלא יצא עדין

."ענייננו הוא מקרה ביניים – אנשים שחייבים באותה מצות קריאת המגילה, אך לא באותו זמן. בעניין זה, למדנו בירושלמי מגילה ב:ג (עג:ב):

בן עיר מהו שיוציא בן כרך ידי חובתו? ייבא כהדא 'כל שאינו חייב בדבר אינו מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן.'בן כרך מהו שיוציא את בן עיר ידי חובתו? ייבא כהדא 'כל שאינו חייב בדבר אינו מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן', או ייבא כהיא דאמר רבי חלבו רב חונה בשם רבי חייה רבה 'הכל יוצאין בארבעה עשר שהוא זמן קריאתה'.

זאת אומרת, תושבי שאר מקומות ("בני עיר"), שחייבים במגילה ביום י"ד, אינם מוכשרים להוציא את תושבי ירושלים וכדו' ("בני כרך") ביום ט"ו, שבו רק בני כרך חייבים. באותו יום, בני עיר נחשבים לא חייבים בדבר. הגמרא מציעה שאולי המצב גם שוה בכיוון ההפוך (שהוא המקרה שלנו), שבני ירושלים אינם חייבים בי"ד ואינם כשרים להוציא בני עיר מידי חובתם, אבל גם טוענת טענה הפוכה, שחיוב יום י"ד חל על כולם, כולל בני כרך, למרות שהם נוהגים לדחות את הקריאה. אם כן, תושבי ירושלים יכולים להוציא בני עיר בי"ד, למרות שבני עיר אינם יכולים להוציא בני ירושלים בט"ו. לכאורה, הירושלמי משאיר את זה בתור בעיא דלא איפשיטא, וכן מפרש הפני משה על אתר.

דיון דומה מוצאים אנו בראשונים על המשנה הראשונה במסכת מגילה, המפרטת "שהכפרים מקדימים ליום הכניסה". פרש"י:

"כלומר...שהכפרים נתנו להן חכמים רשות להקדים קריאתה ליום הכניסה, יום שני בשבת שלפני ארבעה עשר, או חמישי בשבת, שהוא יום כניסה, שהכפרים מתכנסין לעיירות למשפט, לפי שבתי דינין יושבין בעיירות בשני ובחמישי כתקנת עזרא (בבא קמא פב.), והכפרים אינן בקיאין לקרות, וצריכין שיקראנה להם אחד מבני העיר, ולא הטריחום חכמים להתאחר ולבא ביום ארבעה עשר, ופעמים שיום הכניסה בשלשה עשר ופעמים שהוא באחד עשר."

לפי רש"י, בן עיר – שחייב לקרוא רק בי"ד – היה מקדים לקרוא להוציא בני כפר, שלא ידעו לקרוא לעצמם, ביום י"ג, י"ב, ואף י"א. אמנם, יש שחולקים על רש"י, למשל תוס' ביבמות (יד. ד"ה "כי"), והר"ן, אך יש שפוסקים כרש"י בענין.

לענייננו, ישנן דעות מן הקצה אל הקצה. הרשב"א, למשל, חלק על קריאת רש"י וגם הבין שמסקנת הירושלמי היא לא רק שבן עיר אינו קורא לבן כרך אלא שגם בן כרך אינו קורא לבן עיר, כמובא כאן בריטב"א בתחילת מס' מגילה:

ולענין כפרים כשהם מקדימין ליום הכניסה איכא מרבוואתא ז"ל מאן דסבר שבן כפר הוא שקורא להם ולא בן עיר או בן כרך, שהרי בן עיר או בן כרך לא הגיע זמנו וכל שאינו מחוייב בדבר אינו מוציא אחרים ידי חובתן, וכ"ת א"כ יקראו במקומן, הא ליתא שאינם מתקבצים בעשרה אלא בעיר שנכנסין לקרוא בתורה, וזהו דעת הרשב"א נר"ו, והביא ראיה מדאמרינן בירושלמי בן כרך אינו קורא לבן עיר ובן עיר אינו קורא לבן כרך.

אך הריטב"א ממשיך ואומר בשם רבו (מן הסתם הרא"ה), שההלכה עם רש"י, אך אפי' הוא מסכים עם הרשב"א לגבי הירושלמי:

ומורי נר"ו בשם רבותיו ז"ל [כתב] דכפרים המקדימים ליום הכניסה כך היתה עיקר התקנה שיהא בן עיר קורא להם וכחד עם חשיבי, וכיון שעדיין הוא מתחייב לא חשיב לגמרי כמי שאינו מחוייב בדבר, אלא הרי הוא כאותה שאמרו (ר"ה כ"ט ב') כל הברכות כולן אע"פ שיצא מוציא כיון דבר חיובא הוא, ואף אלו הרי כפרים ראויים לקרוא בי"ד עם העיירות, [וכן בני העיירות] פעמים קורים ככפרים כשאין י' בטלנין, [אבל] בן עיר ובן כרך חלוקים לגמרי בדיניהם וזמנו של זה לא זהו זמנו של זה כלל ולפיכך אין אחד מהם מוציא לחברו.

אין צורך לחזק את ביטויו לסברת הדברים (שנשאלו מגמ' מגילה ד:), וכמותו נקט בזמננו הגרש"ז אוירבך (מנחת שלמה ח"א סימן ג) בהקשר של דיון על מי שלא קיבל עליו את השבת האם יוכל להוציא את מי שקיבל כבר את השבת בקידוש. שם הוא מניח שבן עיר ובן כרך אינם מוציאים אחד את השני:

הרי נקטינן דאין בן עיר מוציא בן כרך וכן אין בן כרך מוציא בן עיר...שהוא עכשיו רואין אותו כמי שאינו מחויב בדבר, והן אמנם שאם יחליט לשנות מקומו ישתנה גם דינו אבל מ"מ כל זמן שלא שינה אינו יכול להוציא, משא"כ הכא אותו הקידוש שהוא עכשיו לאחרים אם גם הוא יכוין לצאת בו ידי קידוש הרי יהי' גם ממילא קבלת שבת כאמור לעיל ויפטור ודאי את כולם מקידוש, ולכן מסתפק שפיר הרעק"א דאפשר דחשיב כמחויב בדבר, משא"כ במגילה הרי צריך קודם לשנות את דעתו לעקור את עצמו מעיר לכרך או מכרך לעיר, גם יתכן דשאני קבלת שבת דחשיב קצת כמצוה שכולם חייבים בה, וכיון שהזמן מתחיל מפלג המנחה שפיר חשיב כל אדם מדין ערבות כמחויב בדבר, משא"כ השינוי מעיר לכרך ומכרך לעיר, ונוסף לזה גם נראה דקבלת שבת הוא רק ענין של הלכה דבהכי יוצאין ידי קידוש משא"כ שינוי המקום מעיר לכרך חשיב כשינוי בגוף האדם ולכן אין לך אלא מקומו ושעתו ומתחשבין רק עם המצב כמו שהוא עכשיו ולא בזה שבידו לשנותו...

בקצה השני, הראבי"ה (ח"ב, מס' מגילה סימן תקסב, ובעקביו, המרדכי, מגילה סימן תשע"ה) אומר שבן עיר יכול להוציא את בן כרך ביום ט"ו, למרות שאותו בן עיר כבר יצא מאתמול (ולכאורה, קו"ח שבן כרך יכול להוציא בן עיר ביום י"ד). זה אמנם סותר את הירושלמי ולכן, כמה פוסקים מקשים על המרדכי, שגם נוקט שיטה זו. מהר"ם בן חביב (שו"ת גנת ורדים או"ח, כלל א סימן יג, דף ז סע"ב) והגרצ"פ פראנק (שו"ת הר צבי או"ח ב סימן עה) תירצו ואמרו שהבבלי חולק על הירושלמי בעניין, והנה דברי הרב פראנק:

""...ועל כולם יש להתפלא על הרמב"ם שלא הזכיר כלל דין הירושלמי דאין בן עיר מוציא לבן כרך וגם להיפך וזה פלא. ולכן היה נראה לומר דהרמב"ם ס"ל דמה שהירושלמי אומר דאין בן עיר מוציא לבן כרך וכן הא דמיבעי ליה להירושלמי בבן כרך אי מוציא לבן עיר, הוא מפני שהירושלמי לא הזכיר כלל הדין דיצא מוציא משום דין ערבות, ויתכן דלא ס"ל להירושלמי הדין דיצא מוציא, והרמב"ם נקט שיטת תלמודא דידן דיצא מוציא מדין ערבות, ופשיטא דלא ס"ל לתלמודא דידן הדין דבן עיר אינו מוציא לבן כרך, ולכן השמיט הרמב"ם לגמרי כל דברי הירושלמי.

"אכן, ישנה בעייה רצינית בשיטה זו, והיא שהדין שהיצא מוציא כן מוזכר בירושלמי, ברכות ג:ג/ו:ב, שהבאתי לעיל (כפי שמרן הגר"ע יוסף הדגיש בתשובה שאזכיר לקמן). אמנם, בקונטרס הררי בשדה שבסוף שו"ת הר צבי (עמוד רנ"ד) מובא מכת"י, הרב פראנק הודה על האמת ובכל זאת החזיק בשיטתו וז"ל: "והעירוני שבירוש'...מפורש הדין שאע"פ שיצא מוציא, ומ"מ י"ל דגמרא דידן דס"ל טעמא דערבות אינו מחלק בין בן עיר לבן כרך, ושפיר מוציא בן עיר לבן כרך." לענ"ד, זה עדיין קצת קשה, ראשון, כי לא הבבלי עצמו מפרש את טעם "ערבות" בהקשר זה, אלא רש"י, ולשון הבבלי עצמו ("אע"פ שיצא מוציא") די דומה לזה שלירושלמי, ��עוד, כי אפי' אם כך היה מפורש בבבלי, נ"ל לא מוכרח כלל על בסיס זה בלבד לומר שיש שיטות שונות לשני התלמודים. אפשר בקלות ליישבם (אם יש אפי' מה ליישב!) שדין ערבות חל על כל מי ששייך לאותה מצוה, וכאן יש שתי מצוות נפרדות, כפי שראינו לעיל בריטב"א על מס' מגילה ועוד ("וזמנו של זה לא זהו זמנו של זה כלל"). בכל זאת, אין להשאיר את כת"ה הגרצ"פ פראנק, רבה של ירושלים, בקושיא כזאת וראוי להסביר את שיטתו מסברא. מפתח לסברא כזאת יש למצוא בדברי הגר"ש קלוגר בשו"ת האלף לך שלמה (או"ח סי' שכח) בפסקו שמי ששכח יום אחד בספירת העומר עדיין יכול להוציא את הרבים וז"ל: "ואין סברא לחלק בין אם היה מחוייב בדבר בו ביום, לבין אם לא היה מחוייב ביום זה עצמו, דמה בכך סוף סוף היה בכלל מי שמחוייב בדבר."גם בענייננו, הסברא נותנת שאין להשוות בן כרך ביחסו לבן עיר והפוך מצד אחד לחרש וכדו' ביחסם למחוייבי מצוה בצד שני. הרי אותו חרש אף פעם לא חייב במצוה ההיא, משא"כ אותם בני כרך ובני עיר שחוגגים את בדיוק אותו חג, באותם חיובים, ורק מחולקים בזמן קיומם אך ורק כדי לקיים זכר לאותם בני שושן שהמשיכו להלחם באויבם יום נוסף. הייתכן שאותם בני שושן שסעדו וחגגו ביום ט"ו חוו חווית שבח והודאה חלוקה מזו של בני הפרזות והפוך?! אתמהה! ואם חוויית אחידות חג פורים לתל-אביב לזה של ירושלים הורגשה אצל הרב פראנק, שנפטר בתשס"א, עאכו"כ לימנו, שבגלל ריבוי המשפחות שחלק מבניהן גרים בירושלים וחלק לא, ובכל זאת מתאחדים לפורים, וששני הימים הם ימים חופשיים בבתי הספר וגם מכמה מקומות עבודה, ורבו המקומות שקוראים בשני הימים מספק, הרי פורים היום הוא חג שנמשך כמה ימים, אמנם עם מרכז של חיובים ביום אחד – להם בט"ו, להם בי"ד, ובשנים מסוימות, בי"ג – אך לא בדיוק כמו שבאר הריטב"א לעיל, ש"בן עיר ובן כרך חלוקים לגמרי בדיניהם וזמנו של זה לא זהו זמנו של זה כלל". אולי בתיאוריה נראה ככה למי שאין לו ערים מוקפות חומה, כמו הריטב"א, אך לא נראה כך כלל לרב פראנק, וגם לא לנו. ובכל זאת, הירושלמי אומר מה שהירושלמי אומר, ואפי' מהר"ם בן חביב, שהזכרתי לעיל כבן שיטה עם הרב פראנק, סיים: "ומ"מ אכתי יש ��צדד ולומר שיש לחוש לפסק הירוש' שבן עיר אינו מוציא לבן כרך, ובפרט שהר"ח כהן בתוס' יבמות, וכן הסמ"ג והר"ן, הכי ס"ל."יש דעה שלישית. שוב, הירושלמי פוסל רק בן עיר מלהוציא בן כרך, אך משאיר את השאלה על בן כרך להוציא בן עיר כבעיא דלא איפשיטא. נראה שהריטב"א חזר בדבריו בפירוש על מס' מגילה שהבאתי לעיל, בדבריו בהל' ברכות שלו (שכנראה נכתב מאוחר ביחס לפירושיו לתלמוד, לפי דברי המבוא של הרב מ.ל. קצנלנבוגן, מהדיר מהדורת מוסד הרב קוק, עמ. 4-5, וכך הניח גם הגר"ע יוסף באומרו שהריטב"א חזר בו), פרק ה, אות ג: "המחויב בדבר כשם שאם עשה מצותו כבר מוציא לחבירו כך מוציאו קודם שיוציא לעצמו כגון בן כרך מוציא לבן עיר [אע"פ] שעדיין לא הגיע זמנו." כך הבין גם המאירי (מגילה יט.), שהסברא השנייה בירושלמי הובאה לפסק ולא רק כה"א:

"כלל ידוע בתלמוד כל המחוייב בדבר מוציא את הרבים ידי חובתן מעתה שאלו בתלמוד המערב בן עיר מהו שיוציא בן כרך ובן כרך מהו שיוציא בן עיר והשיבו בן עיר אינו מוציא בן כרך שהרי נפטר לו ופקעה ממנו חובת מגלה בן כרך מוציא בן עיר אע"פ שאין זמנו עדיין שהרי מ"מ חיוב מגלה מוטל על הכל מתחלת ליל י"ד

."וכן, דעת ר' חיים בתוס' יבמ' יד. ד"ה "כי", המובאת לצד איסור, אומרת רק שלפי הירושלמי בן עיר אינו מוציא בן כרך (ושלדעתו בן עיר גם לא מקדים לי"ג להוציא בן כפר), אבל אינו אומר שבן כרך אינו מוציא בן עיר. וכן, מסקנת מהר"ם בן חביב שמצדדת להחמיר, שהבאתי לעיל, גם מחמירה רק על בן עיר להוציא בן כרך ולא הפוך. וזה גם מסקנת מרן הגר"ע יוסף בתשובתו לאסור בן א"י להוציא בני חו"ל בהלל ביו"ט ב' של גליות (שו"ת יביע אומר חלק ח - או"ח סימן מו):

"נלפע"ד בנידון ה[גאון ר' עקיבא איגר] שיכול לקדש לחבירו, דדמי למ"ש הריטב"א (בהל' ברכות פ"ה ה"ג) הנ"ל, שבן כרך מוציא לבן עיר אף שלא הגיע זמנו כיון שעתיד להתחייב במצוה. וכ"ה דעת רש"י שבן עיר קורא לבני הכפרים. וכן הסביר המהרח"א במקראי קודש הנ"ל. וע"ע במאירי (מגילה יט א) בשם הירוש', שכ', בן עיר אינו מוציא לבן כרך, שהרי כבר פקעה ממנו חובת מקרא מגילה, אבל בן כרך מוציא בן עיר, ואף שעדיין אינו זמן חיובו, הרי מ"מ חיוב מק"מ מוטל על הכל מתחלת ליל י"ד. ע"ש. וי"ל. ושו"ר בשו"ת מהרש"א אלפנדארי (חאו"ח ס"ס ו) שהביא דברי הגרע"א הנ"ל, וכתב, ולפע"ד ודאי שיכול לקדש ולהוציא את חבירו, לפמ"ש רש"י והריטב"א והמאירי וכו', שאף שלא הגיע זמנו חשיב שפיר בר חיובא, ואפי' למ"ד בן עיר אינו מוציא לבן כפר, וכמ"ש הר"ן, שאני הכא שבידו לקדש גם לעצמו. וחשיב שפיר בר חיובא...

"סברת שיטה זו טמונה כבר בדברי המאירי המובאים לעיל, שמקורם בסברת הירושלמי להתיר, והיא "חיוב מגלה מוטל על הכל מתחלת ליל י"ד". ראוי לזכור כאן את דברי המגילה בפרק ט במקור החיוב לדורות:

(א) וּבִשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ הוּא חֹדֶשׁ אֲדָר בִּשְׁלוֹשָׁה עָשָׂר יוֹם בּוֹ אֲשֶׁר הִגִּיעַ דְּבַר הַמֶּלֶךְ וְדָתוֹ לְהֵעָשׂוֹת בַּיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר שִׂבְּרוּ אֹיְבֵי הַיְּהוּדִים לִשְׁלוֹט בָּהֶם וְנַהֲפוֹךְ הוּא אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁלְטוּ הַיְּהוּדִים הֵמָּה בְּשֹׂנְאֵיהֶם: (ב) נִקְהֲלוּ הַיְּהוּדִים בְּעָרֵיהֶם בְּכָל מְדִינוֹת הַמֶּלֶךְ אֲחַשְׁוֵרוֹשׁ לִשְׁלֹחַ יָד בִּמְבַקְשֵׁי רָעָתָם...(יב) וַיֹּאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ לְאֶסְתֵּר הַמַּלְכָּה בְּשׁוּשַׁן הַבִּירָה הָרְגוּ הַיְּהוּדִים וְאַבֵּד חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת אִישׁ וְאֵת עֲשֶׂרֶת בְּנֵי הָמָן בִּשְׁאָר מְדִינוֹת הַמֶּלֶךְ מֶה עָשׂוּ וּמַה שְּׁאֵלָתֵךְ וְיִנָּתֵן לָךְ וּמַה בַּקָּשָׁתֵךְ עוֹד וְתֵעָשׂ:(יג) וַתֹּאמֶר אֶסְתֵּר אִם עַל הַמֶּלֶךְ טוֹב יִנָּתֵן גַּם מָחָר לַיְּהוּדִים אֲשֶׁר בְּשׁוּשָׁן לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּדָת הַיּוֹם וְאֵת עֲשֶׂרֶת בְּנֵי הָמָן יִתְלוּ עַל הָעֵץ: (יד) וַיֹּאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ לְהֵעָשׂוֹת כֵּן...(טז) וּשְׁאָר הַיְּהוּדִים אֲשֶׁר בִּמְדִינוֹת הַמֶּלֶךְ נִקְהֲלוּ וְעָמֹד עַל נַפְשָׁם וְנוֹחַ מֵאֹיְבֵיהֶם וְהָרֹג בְּשֹׂנְאֵיהֶם חֲמִשָּׁה וְשִׁבְעִים אָלֶף...(יז) בְּיוֹם שְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר לְחֹדֶשׁ אֲדָר וְנוֹחַ בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר בּוֹ וְעָשֹׂה אֹתוֹ יוֹם מִשְׁתֶּה וְשִׂמְחָה: (יח) וְהַיְּהוּדִים אֲשֶׁר בְּשׁוּשָׁן נִקְהֲלוּ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר בּוֹ וּבְאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר בּוֹ וְנוֹחַ בַּחֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר בּוֹ וְעָשֹׂה אֹתוֹ יוֹם מִשְׁתֶּה וְשִׂמְחָה: (יט) עַל כֵּן הַיְּהוּדִים הַפְּרָזִים הַיֹּשְׁבִים בְּעָרֵי הַפְּרָזוֹת עֹשִׂים אֵת יוֹם אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר לְחֹדֶשׁ אֲדָר שִׂמְחָה וּמִשְׁתֶּה וְיוֹם טוֹב וּמִשְׁלוֹחַ מָנוֹת אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ: ...(כא) לְקַיֵּם עֲלֵיהֶם לִהְיוֹת עֹשִׂים אֵת יוֹם אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר לְחֹדֶשׁ אֲדָר וְאֵת יוֹם חֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר בּוֹ בְּכָל שָׁנָה וְשָׁנָה: (כב) כַּיָּמִים אֲשֶׁר נָחוּ בָהֶם הַיְּהוּדִים מֵאוֹיְבֵיהֶם...

יום י"ד הוא עיקר יום פורים לכל עם ישראל, יום המנוחה לאחר המלחמה ביום י"ב וי"ג – ימים שבפור, הוא הגורל, היו אמורים להיות יום חורבן עם היהודים, ונהפוך הוא. לפי בקשת אסתר, יום י"ד היה יום נוסף של נקמה נוספת. לא נראה שיהודי שושן הגנו על עצמם באותו יום – זה נעשה מאתמול – אלא לקחו יום נוסף לגמור את הנקמה. בודאי שאותם יהודי שושן חוו את נצחונם של העם וגדולתו של מרדכי והשתתפו בשמחת העם, אלא שדחו את המנוחה יום אחד. כדי לזכור את זה גם אנו דוחים את עיקר החגיגה לתושבי ערים מסויימות. החיוב כבר חל ביום י"ד; דוחים אנו את ביטוי החגיגה על אותם תושבים כדי לזכור עוד פרט בדרמה של הנס. אין בזה לצמצם את עיקר חלות חיובי פורים על כולם, גם בני כרך, כבר ביום י"ד. אין תושבי ירושלים – בני כרך – חייבים במקרא מגילה בי"ד, כי ראוי לנהוג לדחות את ביטוי החגיגה עוד יום: כך משמעות דברי הגמ' במגילה ד: המובאים גם לצד איסור בריטב"א על מגילה לעיל: "זמנו של זה לא זמנו של זה" – על כל מקום לנקוט את חלקו בהזכרת האפיקה. אבל יום י"ד כבר מודע לאותם בני כרך כיום מנוחה וחגיגה לעם ישראל על נצחונו הנסי, ובמידה שבני כרך נמצאים בפרזות (וכמובן שהשתתפות בבת מצוות האחיינית היא סיבה נהדרת), הם כשרים להשתתף בקריאה להוציא את בני העיר.

מקבילו בבבלי ר"ה כט., והבאתי את לשון הירושלמי רק[1]
בגלל בלבול לגבי הנוסח המדוייק בבבלי שכנראה צ"ל דומה מאד לזה שלירושלמי, כפי שהראה הגר"ל גינזבורג בפירושו לירושלמי ברכות, עמ' 169-172.

Starting the Seder Early

2009-03-26T13:38:00.000-04:00

The Torah preserves a somewhat complex account of the timing of the Exodus from Egypt. According to Shemot 12:29-34, as the final plague hits in the middle of the night, striking down the Egyptian first born, the people are thrown out of Egypt immediately. [This confirms the prediction offered by Moshe in Shemot 11:4-8.] No date is given here, but Devarim 16:1 similarly recalls a nighttime Exodus and identifies the date of the Exodus as חדש האביב or the new moon of Aviv, the month we know of as Nisan. [This date is also supplied by Shemot 13:4, 23:15 and 34:18.] In accordance with this memory, Devarim 16:4,6 specifies that the פסח sacrifice must be offered בערב, once the sun has set, so as to coincide with the time of day when the Exodus happened. [It seems that the point is not that this sacrifice must be offered or eaten at midnight, but that it is sufficient to do so sometime after the sun has set, thus locating the ritual in the night as opposed to the day.]

Shemot 12:1-28 describes the Israelites as slaughtering a special lamb on the 14th of the first month (again, Nisan), at the time of day described as בין הערבים—which is understood in rabbinic tradition to refer to the afternoon. They are then to remain indoors all night, waiting for the Egyptian first born to be smitten so that they can leave triumphantly in the morning. [This account of a triumphant morning depature on the 15th as opposed to a midnight escape is also supplied by Shemot 14:8 and Bemidbar 33:3-4.] This passage also specifies that the lamb to be eaten as part of the nightlong vigil must be eaten at night, though the term בערב is also used to describe the time when matzah should be eaten by future generations.

This complex narrative evoked several rabbinic attempts at harmonization. For one example, see Berakhot 9b. Most important, however, all of the above passages agree that the Egyptian first-born were killed at night and that the sacrificial meal commemorating this event had to take place בערב or בלילה, as opposed to during the day. [See Mishnah Zevahim 5:8.] Since matzah and maror are linked to the Pesah offering by Shemot 12:8, they also may not be eaten until it is nighttime. Tosefta Pesahim 2:22 confirms this point. [Interestingly, that text also emphasizes that one should eat those foods as soon after nightfall as possible.]

A separate consideration from the eating of these ritual foods is the retelling of the Exodus that rabbinic sources assume to be a core part of the observance of Pesah. The Pesah sacrifice was not only a celebratory family meal, it was also meant to be a reaffirmation of the national story. For Hazal, this part of the ritual was anchored in Shemot 13:8, which imagines a parent explaining to a child that the annual Pesah sacrifice is on account of the fact that God “took me out of Egypt.” This verse becomes the basis for the idea of the obligation to tell the story once a year. But since Shemot 13 speaks of the Exodus has happening on the new month of Aviv, this begs the question of when it is acceptable to tell this story.

Mekhilta dR. Yishmael Bo Pisha 17 entertains the possibility that this obligation to tell the story would be valid starting with Rosh Hodesh Nisan, in accordance with the plain sense of Shemot 13, but creatively resorting to the phrase ביום ההוא (on that day) in Shemot 13:8—which probably originally meant “at that future time”—the Mekhilta rejects any telling before the 14th of Nisan, which is the rabbinically accepted day for offering the Pesah sacrifice. The Mekhilta then asks whether one could tell the story on the day of the 14th of Nisan, rather than waiting for nightfall. The conclusion: the phrase בעבור זה (on account of this) demands that the telling be done when one can point to the full complement of ritual foods—the matzah and maror. Since these are only to be eaten at night—following Shemot 12:8’s description—the accompanying narrative ritual must happen at night as well.

We thus get a fairly uniform picture of a Seder ritual that must include the telling of the story along with the ritual of eating matzah and maror after nightfall. Since rabbinic tradition always deals stringently with twilight in the context of biblical mitzvot, this would seem to translate into waiting until the stars come out to begin the telling of the story.

Nonetheless, in the middle ages, an important question arises: Can one start Yom Tov early, treating the time before nightfall as the 15th of Nisan for ritual purposes and thereby eat matzah before nightfall? Indeed, Berakhot 27a reports that Rav used to pray Shabbat Arvit on Friday afternoon, well before nightfall (and seemingly even before sunset). This suggests that Shabbat can be begun early and the subsequent daylight hours can count as Shabbat. Can one do the same for Pesah?

R. Yaakov of Corbeil (12th-13th c., in Tosafot Pesahim 99b s.v. ad) argues that even though on most Shabbat and Yom Tov evenings one is permitted to begin the festive meal earlier, while there is still daylight, on Pesah the meal is tied to the Pesah offering, which means that the matzah and maror eaten at the start of the meal may not be consumed until nightfall. He cites Tosefta Pesahim 2:22 as proof of this position. [For more on the question of starting Shabbat meals early, see, among other sources, Terumat Hadeshen #1 and Bah’s citation of Maharal of Prague on OH 472.] R. Yehudah Sirleon (12th-13th c., see his Tosafot on Berakhot 27a) rejects this proof: It might be that the Tosefta is only clarifying that the Pesah offering is not to be consumed on the 14th, but rather on the 15th. [Every other sacrifice can be eaten right away on the day when it was slaughtered, such that this novel point must be made to clarify the Pesah offering’s uniqueness.] In other words, the Tosefta’s stipulation of משתחשך for the time to consume Pesah, matzah and maror is not about astronomy, rather it is about the proper ritual calendrical frame. As long as one has ritually begun the 15th of Nisan—by lighting candles, saying Kiddush or otherwise mentally accepting Yom Tov—one can eat the sacrificial meal and its components. R. Yehudah Sirleon thus argues that there is no rabbinic text that clearly forbids starting the Seder early and eating matzah and maror before nightfall. [See Hazon Ovadiah I:1 for further analysis of this position and a close reading of the printed Tosafot on Pesahim 99b and its various versions.]

R. Ya’akov of Corbeil’s approach dominates subsequent discourse, with almost all assuming that matzah may not be eaten until dark. [Aside from those preferring the substantive approach of R. Ya’akov of Corbeil, anyone who rejects the notion that biblical mitzvot tied to a specific day cannot be done before the astronomical onset of the day—אין תוספת יום טוב דאורייתא—also would not be able to accept his view. In other words, anyone uncomfortable with starting Shemini Atzeret early and eating outside of the sukkah for that late afternoon meal would not be able to rely on R. Yehudah Sirleon here. See Taz on OH 668.]

Maharil (Germany, 1360-1427) assumes a standard requiring one to wait until the stars came out to do Kiddush at the Seder, but is perplexed by this. R. Ya’akov of Corbeil’s argument only explicitly requires eating matzah after dark! Why not begin the Seder earlier, and allow Kiddush and the narrative retelling last until nightfall, at which point matzah can be eaten. He therefore explains that the Mekhilta tells us that the narrative retelling is linked to the ritual foods of the Seder. If the latter can only be consumed after dark, then the former can only be begun after dark. He furthermore emphasizes that karpas at the Seder is intended to get children to ask questions and is thus part of the narration. Therefore, this too must be done after dark. Kiddush, strictly speaking, does not need to be done after dark, he argues, but since some people do a longer Kiddush and others a shorter one, the practice emerged to wait for dark to do Kiddush as well.

R. David Abudraham is stricter: he argues that the four cups of wine at the Seder are linked to matzah and therefore cannot be drunk until after dark. Since Kiddush at the Seder is one of the four cups, it too cannot be said until after dark. Terumat Hadeshen #137 makes a similar point, insisting that the Mekhilta demands that all the rituals associated with matzah be done at a time when it is valid to eat matzah. He strengthens his argument by appealing to the midrash first advanced in Yerushalmi Pesahim 10:1 that the four cups of wine at the Seder are intended to hint at the four verbs of redemption used by God in Shemot 6, rather than just serving as anchors of a festive meal. They are thus a mythic unit that cannot be separated from the matzah and maror. [Maharil in fact challenged this logic, since it would seem to require drinking the third and fourth cups before midnight, after which one cannot consume the required matzah at the Seder, a requirement with no basis in earlier sources. Terumat Hadeshen might respond that the key for the four cups is not that they all be at a time valid for the consumption of matzah per se, but rather at night, so as to coincide with the slaying of the first born and Israel’s deliverance.] Nevertheless, this strict approach to Kiddush was not universally practiced. While R. Shimshon b. Tzemah Duran (14th-15th c., North Africa) advances this position as well in his work Yavin Shemuah, a later gloss on that work testifies that it was not common practice to wait until dark to begin Kiddush at the Seder, an effective return to Maharil’s approach. Indeed, while Shulhan Arukh OH 472 takes a strict view on starting Kiddush after dark, R. Ya’akov Reischer (in Hok Ya’akov there) notes that the logic on which this is based is challenged by Maharil and seems to favor the latter’s position. As a result, R. Ovadiah Yosef (in Hazon Ovadiah I:1) rules that while Kiddush should in fact be said after dark, when one is in a difficult situation, one can say it earlier, based on Maharil’s approach. [He goes so far as to argue that Terumat Hadeshen himself would concede this point.]

While almost all subsequent voices endorse the requirement to wait for dark even for Kiddush, some modern authorities questioned this whole line of analysis, suggesting an even more limited reading of R. Ya’akov of Corbeil. R. Yosef b. Avraham Molkho (18th c., Salonica, student of R. Yosef David of Salonica), in his work Shulhan Gavoah, asserts that R. Ya’akov of Corbeil and all other rishonim that only emphasize the importance of eating after dark would in fact permit all prior parts of the Seder to be done earlier. Only the foods directly compared to the Pesah sacrifice, and thus associated with the directive to eat it בלילה הזה, must be eaten after nightfall. But Kiddush, karpas, and the whole narrative ritual of the haggadah, can be done while it is still light out. He in fact claims that the plain language of the Tosefta only seems to be concerned about the rituals of Pesah, matzah and maror, but evinces no concern for the earlier parts of the Seder. As a result, he concludes that almost everyone other than Maharil, Abudraham, Terumat Hadeshen and Rashbatz would permit starting the Seder while it is still light and timing it to get to the eating of matzah at nightfall. Though he prefers starting Kiddush after nightfall, R. Molkho notes that this is only in deference to the Shulhan Arukh, but not because he believes this view to be correct. Hatam Sofer (in his comments on Pesahim 99b) more actively permits starting Kiddush early (possibly only after sunset, though his language there may be an imprecise way of just indicating the onset of Yom Tov) and timing the end of the hagaddah for the emergence of stars. [It should be noted that Hatam Sofer grounds this position in a fairly weak textual argument, even though the substantive position is tenable; the same can be said of R. Ya’akov of Corbeil’s position above.]

Neither of these views directly engage the Mekhilta, which seems to insist that the narrative retelling happen at the time when Pesah, matzah and maror are in play. There are a number of ways they might have addressed this text: 1) They might read the phrase בשעה שמצה ומרור מונחים לפניך to mean when you are engaged in the direct preparation for eating them. Even if it is not yet a valid time for eating them, the fact that the narrative will culminate with their consumption at the proper time is sufficient to meet this criterion. [Note that a close reading of Tosefta 2:22 suggests that it is preferable to eat Pesah, matzah and maror as close to the onset of nightfall as possible.] 2) They may view the Mekhilta as an asmakhta, as having fundamentally less authority than the explicit linkage of the Pesah offering with matzah and maror in the Torah. In other words, whereas the Torah specifies night as the proper time for Pesah, matzah and maror, it is only the Mekhilta that tries to link the narrative telling of the story to the time of the Pesah. Therefore, even if we require the telling of the story to happen on the 15th of Nisan (as opposed to on the 1st of the month or even on the 14th during the day), we don’t have a strong enough linkage based on the Mekhilta alone to require the telling to be after astronomical dark. Therefore, as long as one has ushered in the ritual frame of the 15th (by committing oneself to refrain from forbidden work, lighting candles, and/or praying Arvit), one may say Kiddush and engage in all Pesah rituals that were not specifically earmarked by the Torah for nightfall.

R. Ovadiah Yosef rejects any such deflection of the Mekhilta and assumes it establishes a strong and binding connection between the Hagaddah and matzah and maror. He therefore does not allow for any leniencies—even in pressing circumstances—for anything other than Kiddush.

Summary:

The halakhic conversation surrounding the timing of the Seder is dominated by those voices that forbid starting even kiddush—and certainly everything after kiddush—before nightfall. Also note that the overwhelming consensus of almost all aharonim follows the approach of R. David Abudraham and Terumat Hadeshen as codified by Shulhan Arukh and embraces a vision of the Seder where all of its components are part of a nighttime reenactment ritual. This approach emphasizes how we are reenacting the nighttime deliverance that launched the Jewish people’s freedom and sees all the rituals of the Seder as part of that reenactment. It is therefore the most powerful model and therefore, the most preferable. Nonetheless, people often find themselves at a Seder that will start earlier than this time and can get stuck about how to proceed without causing a major family dispute. The above sources reveal a richer language for understanding a variety of practices that deviate from what emerged as halakhic consensus in most communities:

1) Accepting Yom Tov through Kiddush and starting the Seder early without concern for delaying eating matzah until nightfall. This approach is that effectively defended by R. Yehudah Sirleon, who argued that no rabbinic source explicitly contradicts this practice. This is a real outlier position in the conversation and strips the Seder experience of any astronomical connection to לילה, a key word through not only the Torah’s narrative of this story, but also the Hagaddah’s retelling of it. Given where the halakhic conversation has gone, and the plain sense of לילה in the Bible, this is essentially a deviant practice, though it has at least one defender. One at such a Seder should make the minimal effort to eat some matzah and maror after nightfall as well, even if this model is a way of understanding a family’s practice within halakhic discourse.

2) Starting the Seder early but timing the end of maggid to coincide with the emergence of stars, so that matzah is eaten after dark. This practice is validated in principle by R. Yosef Molcho and in practice by Hatam Sofer (with the latter possibly only permitting if Kiddush is begun after sunset). This approach downplays the critical nature of telling the story at the exact same time when matzah can be eaten; as long as the retelling and the ritual eating are juxtaposed and done within the same ritual time frame, there is no problem.

3) Starting the Seder early, but beginning עבדים היינו—the formal beginning of the maggid—after nightfall. While no authority I have found seems to take this approach explicitly, it is a reasonable position less radical than those above. This approach would affirm the Mekhilta’s linkage of the haggadah to the ritual eating but would balk at the deep significance of karpas, which, after all, has its origins as a typical dipping—or “salad course”—at the beginning of a meal and only later becomes invested with religious significance.

4) Starting Kiddush before nightfall but timing karpas to occur with nightfall. This conforms to Maharil’s position and is endorsed by R. Ovadiah Yosef in difficult situations (such as wanting to avoid family conflict). This approach affirms that anything done differently on the night of Pesah from another Yom Tov is inherently wrapped up with the hagaddah and thus must be part of the nighttime ritual.
5) Starting Kiddush after nightfall. This covers all opinions and reflects the assertion of Abudraham and Maharil that the Seder—which includes Kiddush as the first of four cups—is a set piece that reenacts and retells a nighttime event and thus must be done entirely at night.

Adhesive Name Tags on Shabbat

2008-11-13T13:50:00.000-05:00

The questions surrounding adhesive name tags are those that surround the activites of sewing and tearing, which are activities already explicitly forbidden on Shabbat in the Mishnah. As in the case of all problematic activities on Shabbat, the concerns involve avoiding any kind of professional activity as well as not engaging in activities that are physically transformative in a significant way. Rambam Shabbat 10:11 is the first to make explicit that our concerns about sewing and tearing also apply to gluing and separating items.

In this case, there are probably three different stages of the process of using these sorts of tags that gave you pause, such that you asked the question: 1) Removing the sticker from its protective backing, 2) Applying the sticker to the piece of clothing, and 3) Removing the sticker from the clothing once the activity is over. Let's address them one at a time.

1) Removing the sticker from its protective backing

Rav Ovadiah Yosef, in Yehaveh Da'at 6:24, says this is not a problem, since the backing was only ever placed there with the intention of being removed by the consumer. [This is true, for him, of opening soda bottles and any other kind of packaging that is closed up only in order to open it later.] There are indeed some poskim who are stringent about this--see Mahazeh Eliyahu #70--claiming that the backing was intended to be on for a long time and separating it off is thus undoing what was at least a quasi-permanent connection. R. Ovadiah prefers being strict, if possible, and advocates removing the backing before Shabbat as a way of covering all bases. But in the current case, where you are describing an issue of higher cost and there is no feasible way to remove all the backings before Shabbat and still have the stickers work, he would agree that it is permissible to go ahead and remove the stickers on Shabbat. [Tzitz Eliezer 16:6 suggests another reason to be lenient here: One is not at all interested in the backing, such that it becomes like opening a disposable container to get at what is inside, which is permissible. He also offers a way of satisfying all views in this case: remove the backing and replace it before Shabbat, so that the new adhesion is obviously short-term and temporary.]

2) Placing the sticker on one's clothes

There is a long running debate among poskim as to whether the temporary stitching of two items together is forbidden or not. R. Yoel Halevi b. Yitzhak (Germany, 12th c.) and others permit this sort of temporary action, whereas R. Yeshayah of Trani (Italy, 12th-13th century) and others forbid. Beit Yosef seems to follow the lenient view in Siman 317, though recommends being strict in front of the unlettered halakhic masses, since they will have a hard time distinguishing between permitted and forbidden kinds of tearing and sewing. Indeed, Rema cites this approach as well in SA 317:7.

The case of a name tag is quite plainly a temporary adhesion and therefore is clearly permitted according to the lenient view above, which seems to be the core holding of the Shulhan Arukh. But given the concern about the uninformed masses, though one might be lenient in general, one might be hesitant in this sort of public situation (a community lunch), where people might get the wrong impression that connecting things with glue or other adhesives is simple not forbidden on Shabbat. But there is reason to be lenient here even according to those who are strict with temporary sewing and adhesions. Iggerot Moshe OH 2:84 (R. Moshe Feinstein, US, 20th c.) rules that it is permissible to fasten diapers and pendants with pins on Shabbat. He reasons that there is no issue of sewing at all, because sewing only applies in cases where two items have been made as one. Since the pin and the cloth are never truly joined into one entity, there is no issue. Similarly here, the tag and the clothing quite obviously always remain totally separate, and name tags are designed to be easily removable from clothing. [Hazon Ish OH 156, when he permits the use of safety pins in clothing, uses similar logic to explain why we should not be concerned about the halakhically unlettered masses when dealing with safety pins: this concern only applies to acts that look like the involve real stitches and real connections. This would seem to extend to something like an adhesive backing as well, where it is a fairly sui generis category not easily extended to other areas of practice.]

3) Removing the tag from one's clothes

On most clothes, there is no additional concern here above and beyond what we addressed above. Once the adhesion is not considered a Shabbat problem, neither is the removal. With some clothes (such as wool sweaters), however, little pieces of thread may tear off in the process of removal. Here, the relevant source is Yerushalmi Shabbat 7:2, 10a, where R. Huna rules that one whose clothing got entangled in thorns may remove them carefully in private, provided that he does not tear through his clothing. Rambam Shabbat 22:24 clarifies that even if the clothing rips in the process, there is no cause for concern, given that it was unintended. We are indeed often strict to forbid activities leading to unintentional consequences when we know for certain that the problematic consequence will occur, such that one might still see a problem for a person wearing the kind of sweater that will certainly tear somewhat when the name tag is removed. But R. Ovadiah Yosef in Yehaveh Da'at 6:24 permits removing an adhesive in a similar case, even if some tearing will certainly occur, since the maximal offense will be on the rabbinic plane, given that tearing is only a core biblical concern when it will be followed by some constructive/productive activity. Given that this is a case where the name tag will just be thrown out and no longer used for any other purpose, there is little reason to be concerned here. For those who might be uncomfortable, you can suggest that they may want to leave the name tag on until the end of Shabbat.

By Jaclyn Rubin and Rabbi Ethan Tucker

Purim on Friday

2008-03-15T13:55:00.001-04:00

Seudat Purim on Friday: Level I

Rabbi Ethan Tucker

When Purim falls on a Friday, is it possible to schedule the seudah (festive meal) such that it is eaten very close to Shabbat, thus making it easier for people who work on Purim to fulfill the obligation of the seudah?

The earliest rabbinic sources feature a debate over whether one can, on any week of the year, eat in the hours leading up to Shabbat, though formal legal consensus quickly forms around the lenient view. There is also general consensus that one may begin eating before Shabbat and continue through the onset of Shabbat, provided that, by sunset, one pauses to make iddush and only then continues with one’s meal. However, other sources frown on scheduling even an occasional major meal for Friday afternoon, for several possible reasons: 1) This deprives one of a proper appetite on Shabbat (possibly only a concern for a Friday afternoon meal that ends before Shabbat, as opposed to one that carried over into Shabbat); 2) This deprives one of time to prepare adequately for Shabbat. These concerns led most Ashkenazi authorities to hold that the Purim seudah should be held in the morning when Purim fell on Friday. But many hold that the above concerns do not apply in the context of a seudat mitzvah, where the meal has its own religious value (as in the case of a Purim seudah). Indeed, many Jewish communities throughout history and until today had a regular practice, whenever Purim fell on Friday, to begin the meal in the late afternoon and have it continue into Shabbat.

In brief: It is a well-attested and perfectly legitimate practice to begin the Purim seudah late in the afternoon and have it continue into Shabbat. Even those who normally have the practice to have the seudah in the morning in these situations would be justified in changing their practice in order to accommodate people who would otherwise not fulfill this mitzvah. One should make sure to have made all necessary preparations for Shabbat in advance and to be sure to remember to pray Minhah before the meal. The meal should be begun early enough so that a significant portion of it can be eaten before sunset. Once sunset arrives, one should temporarily stop eating and drinking. The two loaves to be used for Shabbat should be brought out if they are not already on the table and be covered. Kiddush should then be made over a full cup of wine. If wine was already consumed earlier in the meal, בורא פרי הגפן should not be said as part of iddush and one begins directly with אשר קדשנו במצוותיו ורצה בנו. Assuming bread was eaten earlier, hands need not be washed again. The bread should be uncovered and then distributed to those present without saying המוציא. [If bread was not eaten during the earlier meal, then hands should be washed and המוציא said.] People can then resume eating. At the conclusion of the meal, ברכת המזון is recited without על הנסים and with רצה. [Some advocate the inclusion of על הנסים as well.] Kabbalat Shabbat and Arvit then follow.

[Since this practice is today often advanced to aid those who work on Purim, it should be noted that it is preferable not to work on Purim, if at all possible. The Megillah itself describes Purim as a Yom Tov and several early sources actually speak of a ban on doing work. Over time, this more stringent take on Purim was stamped out by rabbinic leaders and popular practice, but voices still persisted frowning on those who treated Purim like a normal work day except for the practice of its distinctive mitzvot. This tension has persisted until the modern day (and pressure to work only increased with the advent of the industrial revolution and its rigid work hours). One can fairly say that the equilibrium point for most poskim is tolerance for those who work on Purim combined with a strong preference for a religious culture that devotes the entire day towards its distinctive mitzvot and more general joyfulness.]

Switching Torah Readers in the Middle of an Aliyah

2008-02-22T14:21:00.000-05:00

Question: Is it an option to switch readers in the middle of one aliyah such that no berakhot are said between readers? Or does it have to become a 2nd aliyah? This question is particularly important as our minyan would like to honor the tradition of reading the entire story of עגל הזהב as part of the second aliyah reserved for a Levi, but we have no one skilled enough to read the entire first aliyah.

Answer: The practice of prolonging the first aliyah of Ki Tissa in order to have the entire story of חטא העגל contained within the second aliyah is mentioned in Magen Avraham 428:8 (R. Avraham Gombiner, Poland, 17th c.). The practice seemingly reflects the fact that Levi was the only tribe that did not participate in this sin and it would thus be shameful for any other Jew to receive the aliyah about this story. However, in the case you describe, there is no problem with having a second Torah reader come up in the middle and take over; see Responsum Har Tzvi OH 1:72 (R. Tzvi Pesah Frank, 20th c., Israel) for one explicit statement to this effect. This has no effect on the aliyah numbering, which is determined solely by the number of sets of berakhot that are said by olim. It is prefereable for the second torah reader (and any others reading parts of that aliyah) to be there for the beginning of the aliyah to hear the opening berakhah such that all readers are a part of this unit in its entirety.

I will note that the one hesitation one should have with this system is the possibility that it will lower standards for Torah reading and that it may dampen individual and communal enthusiasm for cultivating expert readers who can show true כבוד התורה through their investment in this important and public reading of our most sacred text. I will just quote Rosh Megillah 3:1 (R. Asher b. Yehiel, Germany/Spain, 13th-14th c.) to this effect. He argued that one should not have a professional Torah reader and that people of inadequate skill should indeed feel somewhat inadequate and cede the floor to those more skilled, such that they be inspired to work towards a greater skill level. While there is an important role for encouraging participation, splitting aliyot in this way should be done sparingly so as not to deprive people of the chance to stretch themselves to improve their Torah reading skills.

Written by Steven Exler and Rabbi Ethan Tucker

Keeping Kosher in a non-Kosher World

2007-09-08T14:26:00.000-04:00

In this thread, we will discuss issues surrounding keeping kosher in environments not entirely under one's control as well as the issues surrounding having people with different standards of kashrut eat with one another, either in their respective homes or in a neutral space. We will also grapple with issues of Jewish/Gentile interaction over food and how food in general serves as a medium for securing a distinctive religious and social identity.

Musical Instruments on Shabbat

2007-09-06T14:29:00.000-04:00

A full paper on this topic--still under development--can be found here:

In particular, I think there is an angle not yet integrated here that relates to a concern about using tools to make noise, which accounts for general permissions in many quarters to make noise as long as one uses either one's body or non-musical instruments, as in the case of banging on a table.

Mission Statement

2005-04-19T15:02:00.000-04:00

This site is intended to be an open forum for brainstorming approaches to some of the most pressing issues arising in Jewish law today. The goal is threefold: 1) to amass information such that all discussions can be as comprehensive as possible, 2) to gather suggestions for how to think about a range of questions, 3) to suggest practical answers and solutions to the questions that arise.

All are welcome; postings are encouraged to be substantive and to the point. The focus is on synthesizing knowledge, not merely on the process of discussion.